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Supervisor:  D. Diane Davis 
 
Humility, Trauma, and Solidarity: The Rhetoric of Sensitivity enters a 
conversation in rhetorical studies about the agency, effectivity, and conditions of 
possibility for the rhetorical subject. This project is an exploration in several registers of 
the preoriginary affectability that Diane Davis has called "rhetoricity." Rhetoricity 
exposes existents to affection from outside in a structure of addressivity that is 
fundamentally rhetorical. Prior to individuation as a subject, rhetoricity implies that 
beings are differentiated first through response to an address or call. This extra-symbolic 
affection brings one into being as the subject of a rhetorical relation. This project aims to 
inscribe the valences of rhetoricity: its traumatic force, and even violence, but also its 
generation of the possibility for becoming otherwise. These valences are charted through 
chapters on reading and addiction, sensitivity, and identification in hypertext video 
games.  
In "Addiction, Humility, and Rhetoricity," I explore the uncontrollable 
relationality of addiction through a reading of David Foster Wallace's novel Infinite Jest. 
I argue that an addictive habit, even reading habits, indicate the radical affectability of the 
subject. Rhetorical exposedness is a route of access to one's interiority that cannot be 
totally blocked off. The next chapter examines the public controversy over the use of 
trigger warnings in college classes. "Sensitive Students" argues that students' experiences 
  viii 
of trauma mark an exposition to affection that makes teaching possible. In the final 
chapter, "Twisted Together: Twine Games and Solidarity," I argue that a set of hypertext 
video games made by transgender women are contesting the dominant values of gamer 
culture. By confronting players with an alterity internal to identification, these games 
erode the centrality of identification to rhetoric and forward solidarity as a shared relation 
to difference instead. 
This project traces the ways that gender marks and even constitutes the rhetorical 
structure of address. Sensitivity, receptivity, and exposedness are sites of gendering 
marks that persist and reverberate into the very formation of the rhetorical subject. This 
project opens a way for rhetoricians to frame exposedness as a rhetorical moment of 
ethicity: as being outside oneself, being beside oneself, and being for others. 
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I could not possibly speak of the Other, make of the Other a theme, pronounce the Other 
as object, in the accusative. I can only, I must only speak to the other; that is, I must call 
him in the vocative, which is not a category, a case of speech, but, rather the bursting 
forth, the very raising up of speech. 
— Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference 
 
[T]o address you in writing or speech... is already to touch the limit; and to be addressed, 
to 'receive' an address, is first of all to be exposed to that exposedness. 
— Diane Davis, Inessential Solidarity 
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Introduction: Rhetoricity, Sensitivity, and Solidarity 
 
Exposition... is the condition of that whose essence or destination consists in being 
presented; given over, offered to the outside, to others, and even to the self. 
— Jean-Luc Nancy, The Inoperative Community 
  
OVERVIEW 
 In recent years, rhetoricians have worked to expand the scope described by 
"rhetoric" from individualist or even agentive speech and writing to include those forces 
and effects that exceed symbolic meaning alone. Rhetoricians have taken this post-human 
turn in several different directions: toward the sensory (Hawhee, "Rhetoric's Sensorium"), 
such as visual or sonic rhetoric (Gunn); toward the non-human, from animals to object-
oriented rhetorics (Kennedy, "A Hoot in the Dark"; Brown, "The Machine"); to the extra-
human, addressing deities or the dead (Mailloux; Ballif); and also away from the human, 
to a rhetoric whose priority calls into question the very definition and ground of "the 
human" (Davis, Inessential Solidarity). In my view, what has come to be called "post-
humanism" includes many different and disparate attempts to explore what can be done 
with and by rhetorical theory after the deconstruction of the humanist subject. 
 This project, Humility, Trauma, and Solidarity: The Rhetoric of Sensitivity, enters 
a conversation in rhetorical studies about the openness, or the conditions of possibility 
for, the rhetorical subject. Diane Davis's 2010 Inessential Solidarity: Rhetoric and 
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Foreigner Relations challenged the field to "push beyond the (merely) epistemological 
concerns that have for so long circumscribed our theories of persuasion" and begin 
working "toward the examination of a 'nearly existential' affectability, persuadability, 
[and] responsivity" (166). Inessential Solidarity lays out what Davis calls a "rhetoric of 
responsibility" that positions rhetoric as "first philosophy" (14). Davis draws heavily on 
the ethical theory of Emmanuel Levinas, which positioned ethics prior to ontology and 
epistemology, "[i]n contradistinction to the entire history of philosophy" (170 n11). 
Carrying out Levinasian lines of thinking to their logical limits, Davis argues that a 
preoriginary affectability exposes existents to affection from outside, an exposedness 
Davis calls rhetoricity. Frequently figured in the philosophical tradition as a call, this 
affection obligates the "one" whom it affects, although no "one" is yet properly there to 
hear it. The subject responds, and in fact is a response to this calling. It is this "call-and-
response structure" that makes what Levinas calls "ethics" first of all rhetorical. Davis 
contends that a "responsibility to respond, a preoriginary rhetorical imperative, is the 
condition for any conscious subject rather than the other way around" (106). 
 Humility, Trauma, and Solidarity: The Rhetoric of Sensitivity is an exploration of 
rhetoricity in several registers. Rhetoricity exposes existents in a relation of addressivity, 
prior to individuation as a subject. Examining rhetoricity demands, as Davis argues, 
scholarship that "reconsider[s] both the role and the scope of 'affect' in the language 
relation, which would in turn require us to reconsider what this 'language relation' 
involves and who or what might be engaged in it" (166). The Rhetoric of Sensitivity 
departs from this imperative, or call. Its aim is to inscribe the valences of rhetoricity: its 
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traumatic force, and even violence, but also its generation of the possibility for becoming 
otherwise. These valences are charted through chapters on reading and addiction, 
sensitivity or feeling too much, and identification in hypertext video games.  
 The Rhetoric of Sensitivity takes a feminist approach to post-human rhetorical 
theory, tracing the ways that gender marks, even constitutes the rhetorical structure of 
address. Gender leaves its marks everywhere; inscribes itself on all kinds of texts, not 
only the body of the human. The Rhetoric of Sensitivity takes up sensitivity, receptivity, 
and exposedness as sites of these gendering marks that persist and reverberate into the 
very formation of the ethical and rhetorical subject. Gender enters this mix as a trope, 
which is not to say a metaphor: rather gender is a turn, a styling. Tracing this trope calls 
for a refiguring of the rhetorical structure of address, a rephrasing in gendered terms, in 
order to expose both the violence and the possibilities gender holds for rhetorical theory. 
Feminist rhetorical theory must read gender's marks without simply reinscribing them. In 
this project, I argue that rhetorical exposedness, receptivity, and sensitivity are gendered 
figures for the ethical position in the structure of address; exposedness is the condition of 
possibility for receiving an ethical call, and so for coming into being as a rhetorical 
subject. The Rhetoric of Sensitivity argues that this structure of address depends upon an 
exposedness or sensitivity to affection from outside oneself. Like a telephone wire, for 
the call to come in at all, the line has to be open. 
 
  4 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 In the review of literature that follows, I aim to detail the key texts that have 
shaped my thinking about rhetoric, ethics, and gender, and about the centrality of 
exposedness for each of these domains. The philosophers and rhetoricians, including 
Emmanuel Levinas, Diane Davis, Erin Rand, Jean-Luc Nancy, and Avital Ronell share 
what I think Davis helps us see as a rhetorician's concern for address, response-ability, 
and the call. The queer theorists, including Jack Halberstam, Eve Sedgwick, José Muñoz, 
and Ann Cvetkovich demonstrate how to center gender as a category of analysis: wary of 
reifying the violence of prevailing norms while nevertheless engaging in contest over 
what gender itself signifies. Each of these writers and thinkers, and perhaps Jacques 
Derrida most of all, cross the disciplinary boundaries I've just carved out for them, 
demonstrating that even work situated in a single field is often fed by many streams. I 
hope that my approach brings these authors into conversation with one another in a way 
that demonstrates the importance of queer feminism for rhetorical theory, on the one 
hand, as well as the importance of a rhetorical orientation to queer theory on the other. 
 
Rhetorical Ethics 
 Davis's rhetoric of responsibility can itself be read as a response, in part, to a 
calling in the theory of ethics articulated by Emmanuel Levinas. In Otherwise Than 
Being, Levinas articulates a theory of ethics that radically departs from the Western 
tradition in which an individual agent exercises his will and chooses between ethical 
alternatives. Levinas argues instead that the being of an existent is hounded, driven into 
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itself by an exposure to alterity. Being has no spontaneous or autonomous control over 
this exposure; rather, a singular being touches other singularities in an unmediated 
relation that Levinas calls proximity. In proximity, a singular being is affected by alterity 
at zero distance. Levinas is not shy about calling this proximity a persecution. An existent 
is absolutely passive; one suffers the affection of the other as "an undergoing, or a 
Passion" ("Substitution" 82). It is this passion that puts one on assignment as an "I," a 
subject responsible for the other, "backed up against the self, to the point of being 
substituted for all that drives you into this non-Place" (90). Before any freedom, one is 
put on assignment, made responsible for the other by an irremissible passion. Chapter 4 
of Otherwise Than Being, an essay Levinas developed/returned to over decades, is named 
for this movement: "Substitution." I quote here from the 1968 essay version. 
In "Substitution," Levinas argues that being is confined in itself, driven into itself 
though a movement of withdrawal, "an exile in itself," over which being has no 
autonomous or spontaneous control (85). The singularity of one's being does not come 
from any kind of individualism or sovereignty. For Levinas, one's singularity is the result 
of a relation to other singular beings, a touching through which one's own limit emerges, 
an unmediated affection by an/other that Levinas calls proximity. Proximity in Levinas's 
vocabulary should not be understood as the happy (appropriative) discovery of difference 
we might expect from an Enlightenment subject. Proximity in Levinas is an exposure 
from which one cannot be shielded and cannot shrink back. We can't really say that one 
"experiences" proximity, since it affects a singularity at zero-distance, without mediation, 
in short, without the distance or capacity to understand, articulate, or master as we do 
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"experiences." Rather, one suffers the non-experience or the trauma of proximity, says 
Levinas, as "an undergoing, or a Passion" (82).1  
In fact, Levinas goes so far as to call this affection of singular being by another a 
"persecution" in which "subjectivity is thrown back on itself—in itself" (88) and one's 
selfhood obtains from the "impossibility of slipping away" (87, 89). Ethical subjectivity 
for Levinas is given to a singular being as a result of this persecuting affection by an 
originless, "an-archic" exterior—by an other (82). Before one can take up a subjectivity, 
become a subject or an "I" in language, one is first already in the accusative, the direct 
object of the other's affection. Levinas argues that one's being is never one's own being. 
To be an "I," he maintains, is to be "an original non-quiddity—no one—clothed as a 
being by a pure borrowing that masks its nameless singularity by bestowing it with a 
role" (85). Out of undifferentiated being, one is assigned a role. One's subjectivity is 
given, issued in the midst of one's total inaction, what Levinas calls one's radical 
passivity. One's unlimited susceptibility to affection by the other entails, argues Levinas, 
an "anarchic passivity" in which "the self [is] called to being" but yet "is not there to hear 
the call which it obeys" (89).  
He chooses the word "an-archic" to indicate that his description of ethical 
subjectivity is not an account of its emergence from primary origins, but rather of its 
preoriginary conditions of possibility. Jacques Derrida called Levinas's work "an ethics of 
ethics" because it aims to account for the possibility of any ethical decision, any 
                                                
1 In Totality and Infinity, Levinas writes that encounter with the Other is "a traumatism of astonishment" 
(71), and Davis, citing this passage, describes it as "a brush with inassimilable exteriority that reveals an 
irreparable structure of exposure—but without offering anything one could call knowledge and without 
closing the impassible distance between 'us'" (52). 
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occurrence at all in which the self allows the other to come first, "even," argues Levinas, 
"the simple 'after you sir'" ("Violence and Metaphysics 111; "Substitution" 91). Even this 
banal act of self-sacrifice, of according priority to the other at one's own expense, would 
not be possible unless it were the very structure of subjectivity as such. So the sense 
Levinas gives to "anarchy" comes precisely from the originlessness of his ethics: from 
the being of proximity, exposure, and passivity instead of sovereignty, self-possession, 
and arche (80). 
Levinas's ethical subject does not have the freedom to make a choice, to decide 
without coercion between the self and the demand of the other. One is already 
responsible. Levinas writes, "To be a self is to be responsible before having done 
anything. It is in this sense to substitute oneself for others" (94). Before having done 
anything: before any action, any power, any freedom of choice. Levinas argues that this 
(non)condition of extreme passivity makes the ethical subject first of all a hostage: "The 
word 'I' means to be answerable for everything and everyone" (90). "I" am responsible, 
not by my free election, but by my irremissible exposure as a being. Subjectivity is 
assigned to me so that I may answer a call I have not properly heard, the call to being. Let 
me underline that for Levinas, the responsibility to the other is only ever mine: there is no 
ethical principle or injunction for me to enforce. Only "[t]he Other (Autrui) is the end," 
writes Levinas, "and me, I am a hostage" (94). 
So Levinasian ethics—the ethics of ethics—are not a set of prescriptions about 
how you should live, or what is to be done. They are a description of the radical passivity 
which underwrites ethical subjectivity as such. "Substitution" is thus not a self-sacrificing 
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act of a heroic "I"; it is not an act at all (91). It is a passivity and a passion, an unevadable 
responsibility, that conditions all other sacrifice, all "pity, compassion, pardon, and 
proximity in the world—even the little there is" (91). 
Davis argues that the exposedness to affection from outside described by Levinas 
as proximity is a rhetorical quality that is shared by all existents, or beings. Davis 
demonstrates that the ability to respond, one's response-ability or responsibility for the 
other, is given to the ethical subject by their exposure in language. That is, Levinas's 
structure of response is first of all a structure of address, in which a call is put out, in 
some sense received, and without exception responded to. (For Davis, even a non-
response constitutes a response, the way you might ignore a talkative stranger on the bus: 
without the affection of the stranger's address, there would be nothing for you to willfully 
ignore). In fact, the imperative Levinas locates, the demand that "I" respond to the 
influence or affection of the other, is itself a rhetorical imperative. This rhetorical quality 
at the heart of being—Davis calls it rhetoricity—is critical for our beginning to 
understand the import of Levinas's privileging of the radical passivity of the subject over 
and against the action hero of ethics given by philosophy's western canon. 
 If the subject of ethics were active, in charge, making his own decisions as 
autonomously as Kant's purely rational being, then he could not be exposed to the 
influence of the other. (The masculine pronoun here is no grammatical accident. The 
privileges of subjectivity here are the privileges of the masculine.) In a Heideggerian 
register, there is no Being-for-itself that is not first a being-for-the-other. In Davis's 
rhetorical register, radical passivity as Levinas explains it points to an irrepressible 
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rhetoricity that obtains between beings, even defining their singularity as beings. So it is 
rhetoric—at its core, addressed language—that is thus the fundamental relation through 
which ethical responsibility is both formed (or better, given) and then taken up. 
 
Levinas's Gender Trouble 
 I want to reflect for a moment on the disparate potential readings of gender one 
may draw from Levinas's work. In a footnote, Davis calls out "the potentially 
androcentric presumption" Levinas makes in figuring alterity as "the feminine" in his 
early work Existence and Existents. She remarks that "the enormity of Levinas's gender 
trouble begins right there" (184 n18). Citing the feminist criticism of Levinas by "Luce 
Irigaray, Tiny Chanter, Jacques Derrida, and many, many others," Davis takes note of the 
way Levinas complicates this figure in his more mature work (185 n18).  
 Derrida's criticism of the work of gender in Levinas begins in his "Violence and 
Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas" first published in French 
in 1964. In the footnote that closes the essay, Derrida writes in part that Levinas's 
"Totality and Infinity pushes the respect for dissymmetry so far that it seems to us 
impossible, essentially impossible, that it could have been written by a woman. Its 
philosophical subject is man (vir)" (320 n92). Implied by this remark is a feminist 
criticism of a bias toward virility that for Derrida redounds not to Levinas as an 
individual but to the language of metaphysics itself. "[P]erhaps metaphysical desire is 
essentially virile," writes Derrida, "even in what is called woman" (320 n92). I think it is 
possible to read Derrida's criticism as implicating metaphysics with/in the operation of a 
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gendering machine, something that produces and opposes virility and/to femininity, and 
that privileges presence as virility. If so, Derrida's critique may open the question of the 
priority of gender (which is also the privilege of presence, of dissymmetry, and so 
perhaps is priority itself) as well as the question of how Levinas's work ultimately 
challenges or topples the philosophical subject identified in this note.  
 Derrida returns to this note, citing it in his 1980 "At This Very Moment in This 
Work Here I Am" (40). Derrida again prods Levinas on the question of the feminine, 
arguing at once that Levinas's work "has always rendered secondary, derivative, and 
subordinate" not femininity itself but rather "alterity as sexual difference" as opposed to 
the "alterity of a sexually non-marked wholly other"—that's on the one hand, but on the 
other hand Derrida argues that this one "who is not yet marked is already found to be 
marked by masculinity" (40).2 Drawing on this essay, Davis seems to conclude with 
Derrida that "the language of E. L. demonstrates a consistent and disappointing allergy to 
the elle"—although, she continues: "it is not necessary to conclude that Levinasian ethics 
demonstrates that same allergy" (144). 
 And yet, something of the gendering of this Levinasian radical passivity persists, 
more than an accident of the theorist's bias. To open a feminist line of inquiry on 
rhetorical ethics in pursuit of an analysis of gender, we must first admit that although 
Levinas's ethical subject looks very different from the subject of supreme mastery and 
                                                
2 I've made a Twine game out of the closing passage of Derrida's essay, playable online at 
http://kendallgerdes.com/twine/atvm.html. Each time Levinas's initials appear in sequence in Derrida's text, 
a hyperlink takes players to one of Derrida's citations in this work of Levinas. 
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virility that his theory challenges, Levinas too is implicated in a certain privileging of the 
masculine: "Even the simple 'after you sir.'" 
 
Femininity, Alterity, and Queer Passivity 
For further warrant in that investigation, I turn to Jack Halberstam's Queer Art of 
Failure. Halberstam's queer approach asks what happens to feminism where the category 
of "woman" is no longer stable or essential—a question all feminists should have arrived 
at by now. Halberstam draws on an archive of postcolonial feminist literature and 
performance art ranging from Jamaica Kincaid to Saidiya Hartman to Kara Walker and 
Yoko Ono, arguing that these artists provide "an ongoing commentary on 
fragmentariness, submission, and sacrifice" as excessive and politicized forms of 
femininity (139). Halberstam points us toward another iteration of "radical passivity" that 
he argues "allows for the inhabiting of femininity with a difference" (144). 
Halberstam argues that the "radical passivity" of queer femininity is a site of "a 
critique of the organizing logic of agency and subjectivity itself" (131). In responding to 
the call for an intellectualism that "can learn how not to know the other," and "how not to 
sacrifice the other on behalf of [my] own sovereignty" (128), Halberstam proposes 
radical passivity as the basis for a "shadow feminism." Shadow feminism "offers spaces 
and modes of unknowing, failing, and forgetting as part of an alternative feminist project" 
(124). Instead of pursuing equality or inclusion, shadow feminism side-steps the 
ensnaring humanism of liberal feminisms and "unravel[s] their logics from within" (124). 
A shadow feminism is one that infiltrates the masculinist version of subjectivity and 
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throws it into crisis.  
Through Levinas, we might read shadow feminism as a disruptive encounter with 
alterity as such—figured as the feminine—that deactivates the logic of agentive power 
and destabilizes the subject. Such an encounter in Levinas's vocabulary is an encounter 
with "the face." It returns me to the preoriginary scene of my radical passivity, my utter 
vulnerability to the other's affection, and my persecutory responsibility to respond. It 
shuts off my interpreting machine and so gives me back over to the non-experience of 
proximity, exposure, and substitution. Though articulated at another level of experience 
than Levinasian ethics, Halberstam argues that shadow feminism may also lead us away 
from the masculinism of humanist subjectivity, and even away from being, so defined, at 
all. Halberstam asks, "Can we think about this refusal of self as an antiliberal act, a 
revolutionary statement of pure opposition that does not rely upon the liberal gesture of 
defiance but accesses another lexicon of power and speaks another language of refusal?" 
(139). I think Levinas gives us an ethics that says yes—although our passivity is 
unequally distributed, it is ultimately, inescapably shared. There is no power that can 
eradicate my exposure in absolute passivity, and therefore, no power that can free me 
from my responsibility to respond.3 
 Halberstam follows the traces of gender on radical passivity by exploring the self-
destructive, even masochistic valences of shadow feminist performance art. He rejects a 
                                                
3 Death, perhaps, which Derrida has called death "a certain experience for the survivor of the 'without-
response.'" In remarks delivered at the funeral of Emmanuel Levinas, Derrida holds, "But even this 
nothingness presents itself as a 'sort of impossibility' or, more precisely, and interdiction. The face of the 
Other forbids me from killing; it says to me 'you shall not kill,' even if this possibility remains presupposed 
by the interdiction that makes it possible" ("Adieu" 5). 
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comparison of Yoko Ono's 1964 "Cut Piece," in which the artist allows the audience to 
use scissors to remove all of her clothing, to male performance artist Chris Burden. About 
this comparison Halberstam argues: "Male masochism certainly stakes out a territory 
very different from female performances of unraveling. While the male masochist 
inhabits a kind of heroic antiheroism by refusing social privilege and offering himself up 
Christ-like as a martyr for the cause, the female masochist's performance is far more 
complex and offers a critique of the very ground of the human" (139). Although 
Halberstam draws the contrast here in terms of male and female, significantly the analysis 
hinges on the relative position of a performance artist to social privilege. Deliberately 
ceding the privileges of masculinity (through submission to masochism) produces a 
"heroic antiheroism," at least at one level reinscribing the privileged masculinity in 
heroism. If, however, one does not have access to those privileges to cede, then 
submission, pleasuring in pain, self-sacrifice and self-destruction all take on murkier (and 
perhaps more frustrating) significations that Halberstam argues "critique…the very 
ground of the human." The critique stems from the female (or feminine) artist's refusal to 
want that which she is not really offered anyway: power, self-possession, even self-
preservation. However far the path of Halberstam's argument may lay from the path of 
Levinas's, their criticism comes to this shared point: the woman (or the self) is not first of 
all for-itself, not active or initiating, not free. She is first of all exposed, persecuted, 
responsible for the other before having done anything. 
 But my statement of this central claim conceals slippages: what are the different 
implications of describing a self, a woman, a female, a femininity? Perhaps the most 
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obvious question raised is whether Levinas's self (or same) could really receive a 
feminine gender, even in the form of a pronoun (although Davis and Derrida seem to 
leave Levinasian ethics a small space for this possibility, even where Levinas won't, 
[Davis 144]). But this slippery question opens onto others: how is radical passivity 
effected (and affected) by its alignment with the feminine? How does its critique of the 
ground of the human change, between its appearance in Levinas as unmarked by gender, 
and its appearance in Halberstam as marked especially by femininity? And perhaps most 
importantly for rhetoricians, what would it mean if a foothold for feminist critique was 
already lodged inside the rhetorical structure of ethics as such? That is, if gender (namely, 
femininity) already marked the very rhetoricity of ethics, and of subjectivity as such? The 
exploration of these questions requires a disciplinarily promiscuous rhetoric; a shadow 
rhetoric that slips into the queer heart of ethics and exposes the traces of gender that it 
finds there, even when gender isn't the only or most explicit vector for analysis. 
 Still: It would do quite a bit of violence to simply align passivity and femininity 
and treat Levinas's work as if it were somehow woman-centered. In Loser Sons: Politics 
and Authority, Avital Ronell writes: "I am not insane: It would be fairly outrageous to say 
Levinas has run down patriarchy" (34). "[B]ut," she continues, "the points he makes are 
differently scored and may assert the deliberations of another exposition of patriarchy" 
(34). I wholeheartedly agree: another exposition still is needed. Ronell contends that 
Levinas, "[b]eing in some essential ways flattened out and dented by the free run of 
patriarchy," has "had to let go of the presumptions, to some degree ensnaring, of 
humanism" (34). This is a carefully measured, and mixed, assessment of Levinas's gender 
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trouble, one that should be kept in mind when we interrogate the association of 
femininity with alterity and with passivity. 
 
Queer Rhetoric and Feeling Too Much 
 I hope to situate this project along these lines as an exposition of those masculinist 
and humanist privileges that have been insinuated into our understanding of, and 
philosophizing about, "the" rhetorical subject. This project is, I hope, a work of queer 
feminist criticism, opening the question of gender even when gender as such isn't the only 
or most explicit vector of analysis. A place for this work in rhetorical studies has just 
begun to be made. In Erin Rand's 2014 book Reclaiming Queer: Activist and Academic 
Rhetorics of Resistance, Rand opens a conversation about the limits of rhetorical agency 
through her inquiry into the relationship between queer activism and academic queer 
theory. Rand's final chapter, "Risking Resistance," forwards queerness as the condition of 
possibility for (as well as the excessive remainder of) any exercise of rhetorical agency. 
Agency arises through "a founding exclusion" of queerness, Rand writes, but the trace of 
that exclusion therefore marks agency, leaving open a gap for resignification again. 
Queerness, here, is a wellspring of rhetorical invention, or as I argued in my review of 
Reclaiming Queer, "a utopian impulse whose deferral always inaugurates something 
(else): something other than only those effects an agent intended" (Gerdes 163). 
Resignifying queer as "the resource by which all agency is actualized," Rand positions 
queer as a rhetorical term: not a description of motives or an effect of agency's exercise, 
but as precisely the excess that makes this agency possible (22). 
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 Rand's view comports with the view of what queerness is and can do—and what 
queer scholarship is and can do—advanced by José Esteban Muñoz in his influential 
book Cruising Utopia: The Then and There of Queer Futurity. For Muñoz, queerness is  
"a structuring and educated mode of desiring that allows us to see and feel beyond the 
quagmire of the present" (1). That is, queerness is a way of feeling. Futurity is a crucial 
part of Muñoz's view of queerness, and he explicitly rejects the antisocial (or 
antirelational) turn in queer theory (widely associated with Lee Edelman's No Future: 
Queer Theory and the Death Drive, which argues that futurity always entails a hetero-
reproductive imperative). Instead, Muñoz calls for queer worldmaking in the tradition of 
Eve Sedgwick's reparative reading. Sedgwick's bellwether essay on "Paranoid and 
Reparative Reading" argues that queer people and all those who are exposed to 
"exemplary and spectacular, pointedly addressed" violence cannot end this violence by 
simply uncovering its presence—such violence is not even well-hidden (Touching 
Feeling 140).4 Against the constraints of such violence, Muñoz writes: 
We must strive, in the face of the here and now's totalizing rendering of reality, to 
think and feel a then and there. Some will say that all we have are the pleasures of 
this moment, but we must never settle for that minimal transport; we must dream 
                                                
4 In the run up to the 2016 presidential election in the United States, less than a year after the Supreme 
Court's decision recognizing gay marriage in all 50 states (Obergefell v. Hodges, 2015), a campaign of 
conservative backlash began targeting transgender people through state legislatures (HB 2 in North 
Carolina, and HB 1523 in Mississippi, both of which became law; HB 2412 in Tennessee, which was 
tabled). Such laws bring the violence of essentialist gender binarism into fresh relief. The stakes of what 
masculinity and femininity are made to mean are still high, over and against the portrait of tolerance 
marriage may have seemed to some to provide. Gender is not just an abstract academic subject; it is 
ultimately about livability, solidarity, and survival.  
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and enact new and better pleasures, other ways of being in the world, and 
ultimately new worlds. (1) 
Queerness, then, is not simply an undisciplined excess of feeling, but rather the 
something else deferred or left undone by the disciplining force of norms. Muñoz: 
"Queerness is that thing that lets us feel that this world is not enough, that indeed 
something is missing" (1).  
 This kind of feeling is not always easy to bear. If we were to frame it in 
Levinasian terms, we'd find ourselves in the register of persecution, perhaps resonating 
with what Sedgwick called "pointedly addressed" violence. Queer people have cultural 
histories of negotiating and surviving such violence, and I want to briefly mark one 
specific such history as charted by Ann Cvetkovich in an essay entitled "Untouchability 
and Vulnerability: Stone Butchness as Emotional Style."5 Cvetkovich argues that "stone 
style" can be read as a style of feeling that encompasses the emotional as well as the 
sexual. Contextualizing the sexual "untouchability" of stone butches in the historical 
crucible of spectacular public and police violence against butches, Cvetkovich argues that 
stone style is a resistance to the traumatic violation of "being made to feel" (162). But 
against the temptation to interpret this resistance as a macho rejection of the exposedness 
to feeling, or affectability, that underpins such violation, Cvetkovich contends that stone 
style is marked by "a performance of interiority in which the display of feeling can take 
the form of not showing it" (159). For the stone butch, feeling too much may be 
                                                
5 Cvetkovich revised and extended much of this essay for a chapter on "Trauma and Touch" in her book An 
Archive of Feelings. 
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negotiated by a refusal to show feeling at all. Stone style, I think, calls into question the 
normative interpretation of gender that would align masculinity with stoicism, dignity, 
emotionlessness, and impenetrability while saddling femininity with privacy, care, 
receptivity, and bearing the burdens of others. At the heart of the knot of gendered norms 
and their revisions that is stone style, an affectability or exposure to affection from 
outside still obtains, and even one defined by their untouchability first of all opens to a 
profound and preoriginary affection, giving that one the gender assignment of responding 
to their queer excessive feeling. 
 Exposedness is at the heart of this project. In the essay "Shattered Love," 
collected in Jean-Luc Nancy's The Inoperative Community, Nancy writes, "The heart 
exposes, and it is exposed" (89). The essay positions "the heart" as something like the 
essence of a subject, but also something that undoes the quality of being in-itself that 
would hold a subject as such together. The heart exposes because it is the site of a love 
that makes the heart not broken, but a break: "The heart is not an organ, and neither is it a 
faculty. It is: that I is broken and traversed by the other where its presence is most 
intimate and its life most open" (99). The subject is, Nancy argues, broken into by this 
touch, "and he [the subject] is from then on, for the time of love, opened by this slice, 
broken or fractured, even if only slightly" (96). "From then on," writes Nancy, "I is 
constituted broken" (96), and the subject is organized not around a core, but around what 
Nancy calls shatters. Nancy argues that this relation of touching at the limit that both 
joins and separates existents gives each being the site of its finitude. It is, for Nancy, an 
unmediated relation. For Levinas, though, "my" subjectivity is already given over to the 
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other before "I" can in any sense be said to be(come) a subject. The immediacy of this 
relation without relation (since there no distance between "us" yet) is in Levinasian terms 
a proximity, a passion of being so severe, a persecution for the other so intense, that "my" 
ipseity comes out of a substitution. Maybe Nancy would permit me to say, my heart is 
already broken into, and given away. 6 An undeniable exposure to exteriority is already 
installed even at the heart, and at the heart as figure for irreducible essence. Nancy: "Love 
is at the heart of being" (88). So an exposition of this exposure opens the heart of my 
project. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 This project is one of a growing number of responses to a call Diane Davis has 
issued in Inessential Solidarity "to think the limits of reason... by tracking the 
implications... of a radically generalized rhetoricity" (36). Rhetoricity "precedes and 
exceeds symbolic intervention," Davis argues, and so a path lies open for rhetorical 
scholarship to go beyond the explication of symbolic meaning or exchange. Davis writes 
that the task of Inessential Solidarity is "to expose a solidarity that precedes symbolicity" 
(15, emphasis mine). In the passage I have selected as the epigraph for this dissertation, 
Davis explains that "to address you in writing or speech... is already to touch the limit" 
where, according to Nancy, "meaning [sens] spills out of itself" (16). Davis continues, 
                                                
6 Nancy in fact underwent a kind of substitution, receiving a heart transplant in the early 1990s (see his 
"L'Intrus"). 
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reversing the polarity, "to be addressed, to 'receive' an address, is first of all to be exposed 
to that exposedness" (16). 
 My task here will have been to stay with that reversal, to offer my own address 
and exposition of the "inappropriable exposure" that is one's receptivity to address.7 
Exposure both conditions and exceeds the rhetorical acts around which the following 
chapters are organized: reading, feeling, and identifying. Davis calls this exposure 
"inappropriable" in part because it "insists and resists" the pose of scholarly mastery that 
would press it into the service of meaning. To write or speak of this exposure is 
necessarily to inscribe meaning, but following Davis, meaning spills out of itself and 
exposes the preoriginary relationality that she calls "inessential solidarity" (16); my task 
is to expose the exposedness that makes address possible. 
 I am tempted to call this method "deconstruction," but against the tendency to 
mistake deconstruction for a codified and simply replicable set of practices, I offer 
another name for what is happening here: dehiscence, a kind of rupturing. Its 
philosophical sense implies aporia, uncertainty, or inconclusiveness. And it has two 
biological senses: one in which a mature plant structure spontaneously splits open, and 
one in which a previously closed wound reopens. These senses shade my orientation to 
exposure; dehiscence is the work of opening something that is ready to bear fruit, or else, 
has been sewn shut in a way that will not hold; it isn't immediately clear which case one 
is working with, or what the yield will ultimately be. 
                                                
7 Once we begin to write or speak of initiation and reception, I hold, we have already begun to write or 
speak of the operation of gender. A gendering machine produces masculinity and femininity, and it opposes 
one to the other through a binary and mutually exclusive logic. I track the gendering of addressivity like a 
trope, through its traces. 
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 Exposure, then, is some kind of rupturing open; it is also a photography term for 
the amount of light falling on film or on a digital sensor. Different exposures of a single 
subject take in different amounts of light over time, creating different images. The 
different subjects of the chapters that follow are also different exposure of a single 
subject: the very exposedness that underpins address itself. It may be a bit exhausting to 
pursue a line of thinking to the place where it dead ends,8 but from this point one may 
back up and retrace one's steps, or else take a hard turn in another direction, approaching 
again from another angle.  
 One way of describing the subjects in the chapters that follow is: addiction, 
trauma, escape. Or: reading too much, feeling too much, identifying too much. The 
excessiveness—too much—installs a queerness in this work. And, the other way around: 
it is queerness that has trained me to read excess and to read excessively, to feel too much 
for too muchness, to overidentify with the unidentifiable. To feel, to read, to identify are 
all rhetorical acts in which one reaches outside oneself in response to what has reached 
you inside. Each presupposes a prior affectability, or in place of the agentive language of 
"ability," a prior exposure to affection. And through each chapter or exposition, I hope to 
assign a slightly different meaning to exposedness: it appears alongside reading as 
addiction; alongside trauma as sensitivity; alongside identification as solidarity.9  
 Part of what I want to demonstrate is that this method can give us insight, but it 
does not in and of itself solve problems, is not available for direct translation into a 
                                                
8 Exposure is also a way of dying, a being unshelteredness against potentially intolerable extremes (of heat 
or cold, starvation, or dehydration). 
9 Mine is a selected trinity; other exposures are possible. 
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practice or a pedagogy or an answer to the question, "What is to be done?" If this sounds 
like a concession to critics of post-structuralism, post-modernism, or post-humanism, it is 
because the failure of theory to meet their demand for politics is construed by these 
critics as a shortcoming and a fault, even a reason to reject the method. But as both 
Levinas and Davis are at pains to underline for us in their theorizing, ethics is anarchic. It 
does not guarantee a politics. That is to say: politics cannot be derived from ethics 
through principle. This anarchy is what gives rise to undecidability, that crucible through 
which we must put our thinking (or better, through which thinking must put us) before 
any decision takes place. My hope is that this exposition will change what we are (or first 
of all, I am) capable of thinking, feeling, and becoming. 
 
TRAJECTORY OF THE TEXT 
 In the chapters that follow, the rhetorical relation that exposes us in language 
appears alongside addiction, trauma, and video games as objects of study that help to 
make something about this exposedness show up, or become available for reading. 
Through each runs a thread that ties receptivity to relationality. 
 In "Addiction, Humility, and Rhetoricity," I explore the uncontrollable 
relationality of addiction through a reading of David Foster Wallace's 1996 novel, Infinite 
Jest. I argue that an addictive habit, and even one's reading habits, indicate the radical 
affectability of the subject. To be a rhetorical subject is to be exposed in language, open 
to affection from outside oneself. This exposure means that no rhetorical subject can be 
truly and impenetrably closed, but is always exposed to address, and under the influence 
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of the pharmakon that is language. This rhetorical exposedness is like an open wound, a 
route of access to one's interiority that cannot be totally blocked off.   
 The next chapter, "Sensitive Students," examines the public controversy over the 
use of trigger warnings in college classes. When student activists at a few universities 
advocated for the use of trigger warnings, a backlash of opinion pieces shouted down the 
legitimate concern that such warnings were designed to address. I zero in on the response 
of Jack Halberstam, queer theorist and public intellectual, who panned students for 
seeking protection from the university as a neoliberal institution. "Sensitive Students" 
argues that the experiences of trauma to which trigger warnings respond indicate the 
exposedness to affection from the outside that Halberstam and others claim is threatened 
by trigger warnings. I counter that this exposedness, rather than needing to be defended 
from student activists or feminists or both, is the condition of possibility for both the 
relationality and individuation that make teaching possible. 
 In "Twisted Together: Twine Games and Solidarity," I turn to a set of video 
games made with Twine, an open-source text-based tool recently hailed by The New York 
Times Magazine as the "video game technology for all" (Hudson). Twine's features as a 
game design platform have made it a popular choice for game designers and authors to 
contest the dominant values of gamer culture. The success of a Twine game called 
Depression Quest, for example, touched off a campaign of gendered intimidation and 
violence known as #GamerGate because of the challenges Depression Quest presented to 
the highly policed definition of a video game. The permutations in what counts as a video 
game that Twine has made possible make visible the violence of identification and 
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confront players instead with an alterity internal to identity, the shared relation to 
difference that is solidarity. 
 In each of these chapters, rhetorical exposedness is figured a bit differently: first 
as humility, then as sensitivity, and finally as solidarity. Each one of these figures shows 
some different quality or consequence of rhetorical exposedness. It is my aim that this 
project intervenes in the debate in rhetorical studies over agency and effectivity by 
arguing for the priority of rhetoric to ethics. The Rhetoric of Sensitivity opens a way for 
rhetoricians to frame exposedness as a rhetorical moment of ethicity, being outside 
oneself, being beside oneself, and being for others. This project concludes with a 
reflection on the difficulty of doing posthuman feminist critique, and closes by sounding 
a call for rhetoricians to consider themselves crucial to the future of feminism, exponents 
of gender as a condition of possibility for the rhetorical structure of address itself. 
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Chapter 1: Addiction, Humility, and Rhetoricity10 
 
Offering a discreet if spectacular way out, an atopical place of exit, drugs forced decision 
upon the subject. 
— Avital Ronell, Crack Wars 
 
What looks like the cage's exit is actually the bars of the cage....The entrance says EXIT. 
There isn't an exit. 
— David Foster Wallace, Infinite Jest 
 
 The figure of the addict is contradictory. An addict is someone whose choices 
have both impaired and exceeded their own control. So deeply under the influence of 
whatever substance happens to be the object of their addiction, they can no longer accept 
influence from anyone else, any other person, or part of the world. The addict is someone 
so mastered by something exterior to them that they are enclosed with it in their own 
interiority. Addiction is a figure, then, for possible blockages along this route of 
connection between interior and exterior, between subject and world. 
 This chapter takes the figure of addiction for a way of exploring the connection, 
exposedness, or sensitivity that rhetorician Diane Davis has called "rhetoricity." In her 
book Inessential Solidarity: Rhetoric and Foreigner Relations, Davis describes 
                                                
10 A version of this chapter has been published as "Habit-Forming: Humility and the Rhetoric of Drugs" in  
Philosophy and Rhetoric, 48.3 (Fall 2015): 338-359. 
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rhetoricity as "an affectability or persuadability" that "precedes and exceeds symbolic 
intervention," and that "is at work prior to and in excess of any shared meaning" (19, 26). 
Rhetoricity is a condition of possibility for rhetoric, or what we might call rhetorical 
praxis; before persuasion or affection can take place, a prior rhetoricity must obtain: 
whoever is touched or moved must first of all be able to be touched or moved. 
Rhetoricity is an ability to be under an outside influence. It is the possibility of the 
outside reaching inside. 
 Against the figure of the addict as closed off, this chapter positions reading as a 
kind of drug habit: an intoxication with alterity, a welcoming within of foreign bodies, of 
influence from outside. Like an addiction, reading is a habit with an insatiable demand 
for more. The ethical problem such habits pose is not how to accomplish a better 
persuasion, a more moral identification; it is how to make a disconnection, how to 
institute an ethical distance between the subject and the substance, to put some critical 
friction into the relation between you and what you consume. Following a view of 
reading articulated by Avital Ronell, I argue that a reading habit is a way of encountering 
difference and opening to exteriority: reading is a mode of engagement with alterity.  
 In the introduction to Reading Ronell, a collection of essays devoted to Ronell's 
work, Diane Davis writes that, "after [Ronell], there can be no past tense to understanding 
and so no end to reading: after her, that is, one can never have read anything" (3). Never 
having read, never getting to be done with reading is a problem that has also been 
provoked by a writer not frequently put into conversation with Ronell: David Foster 
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Wallace.11 Wallace's prolix writing style daunts readers, and his novels, especially his 
1996 opus Infinite Jest (or IJ), have sometimes been used to figure all the books one 
didn't read or can't finish.12 Ronell and Wallace both have written about habits, drugs, and 
literature, but the connection this chapter traces between them is the thread of humility. I 
can't begin to tell you how humbling this project has been, because to do so would make 
me sound proud of my humility. I can only say that I am responding to a call, one that I 
thought I heard in Infinite Jest. I can never be sure that IJ was (or wasn't) addressed to 
me. But then the call of humility would come to me, if it does, obliquely.13 Maybe it was 
meant for someone else, or maybe I am hearing things. But enough of this imitative 
yarn—who am I trying to be, anyway?14—let me explicate this influence I am under. 
 Ronell's texts, frequently occupied with the positing power of language (and with 
the passivity of humans in the face of this power), are themselves crafted with a playful 
inventiveness, a performative decentering of her authority as philosopher. Wallace's 
writing, too, experiments with the limits of fiction, throwing the engines of language into 
over-drive with a style sometimes described as "maximalism." Ronell's writing is 
imbricated with a kind of humility not described in scholarship that treats humility as 
either a moral characteristic or else a deceptive or "merely rhetorical" pose. Ronell's work 
                                                
11 A recent edited collection on focuses on three of Wallace's massive novels and is entitled David Foster 
Wallace and "The Long Thing" (Boswell). 
12 Eve Sedgwick writes of the relation one nevertheless bears to such books that they "can therefore have a 
presence, or exert a pressure in our lives and thinking, that may have much or little to do with what's 
actually inside them"—an awesome power for an unread book ("Melanie Klein" 625). 
13 Responding to the call of humility has brought this writing into being, not as response to a "Hey, you" 
so much as to an "And Lo" (Wallace, Infinite Jest 184), an audible order to "Look!"—a kind of reverse or 
aslant interpellation. If humility hails me, it is not to turn around but rather to stand aside. 
14 David Foster Wallace or Avital Ronell?  
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sounds the call for a profound humility, one she describes as the only possible ethical 
position in her book Stupidity: "I am stupid before the other" (60). Wallace's work stages 
this ethical position as a habit, but forming a habit is not (contra Aristotle) simply the 
result of repeated practice. Habit, especially in Infinite Jest, verges into addiction. 
 In her 1992 Crack Wars: Addiction Literature Mania, Ronell hotwires habit and 
addiction to literature, noting "the pharmacodependency with which literature has always 
been secretly associated" (11). Following Jacques Derrida's "Rhetoric of Drugs," Ronell 
develops a "narcoanalysis," an account of the exposure to exteriority named by "drugs," 
which is also an exposition of the subject's nonability to defend or even clearly define 
oneself against this affection or outside. Ronell maps this Being-on-drugs onto literature 
through a reading of Madame Bovary, describing what we might call a reading habit: 
solipsistic but risking contamination, foreign but taken inside and internalized, libidinal 
and possibly uncontrollable, literature plays out as a fatal drug. It kills by addicting: 
influence becomes addiction when a logic of self-replication attempts to close the channel 
of exposure through which the drug entered. Following Crack Wars, this chapter 
performs another narcoanalysis through a reading of Wallace's Infinite Jest. This reading 
focuses on the possibility that rhetoricity presents of thwarting the totalizing logic that 
structures addiction and of deforming it into a habit of humility. 
 Scholars interested in Wallace have widely interpreted his views on humility 
through the lens of a 2005 commencement speech, later published as This is Water. In a 
frequently cited passage, Wallace convokes the subject of humility as a humanistic 
individual, at risk of remaining self-absorbed and self-imprisoned, "a slave to your head 
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and to your natural default setting of being uniquely, completely, imperially alone" (60). I 
don't contest that Wallace's speeches, interviews, and criticism seem preoccupied with 
this kind of subject, which configures humility as an escape route from the devastating 
trap of solipsism. But this kind of self-enclosed subject is precisely not the kind that 
Wallace's literary fiction both exposes and cultivates. Infinite Jest's treatment of humility 
and its subjects more closely resembles Ronell's Crack Wars than Wallace's This is Water 
insofar as humility emerges at the point where the self-replicating logic of addiction fails 
to foreclose. 
 Enough literary scholarship on Wallace has been produced in the years since his 
death in 2008 to fill four edited collections and establish an annual Wallace conference 
(Hering; Cohen and Konstantinou; Boswell and Burn; Boswell). But this article cannot 
follow the precedent of literary criticism that treats Infinite Jest as an object to be 
understood. Rather, the object of a narcoanalysis "resists the revelation of its truth to the 
point of retaining the status of absolute otherness" (Ronell, Crack Wars 49). Infinite Jest 
resists a hermeneutic interpretation, and so the yields of this reading will have been other 
than a more complete understanding.15 In this article Infinite Jest plays the role of an 
informant. Literature "in the widest sense," Ronell argues, "has a tradition of uncovering 
abiding structures of crime and ethicity with crucial integrity" (11).16 But, Ronell 
                                                
15 After Wallace's death by suicide in September 2008, the insinuation that chemistry (neurological, 
pharmacological) could be used determinatively in interpreting his writing circulated, in my opinion 
ignobly. Against this particular violence of understanding stands the gift of Karen Green's 2013 memoir 
Bough Down. Green, who was married to Wallace, inscribes grief as a nonexperience, inappropriable to 
meaning. Humility, I think, calls for an analysis that proceeds according to this latter spirit. 
16 As a work of fiction, some might prefer Infinite Jest stay confined to the realm of nonserious language. 
See Austin, but especially Searle. But as Derrida argues in Limited Inc, no "simple logic" separates serious 
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cautions, such informants are "nobody's fools" (11). If the text will "talk," I hazard, it will 
not be to the authorities, not to parties interested in mastering the text by enforcing the 
stability of its meaning. Infinite Jest rather appears here as a supplier of the rhetorical 
substance Ronell calls "tropium," that is, a relationship of citation by which one text 
intoxicates another. IJ intoxicates this chapter; it introduces, through tropium, an "outside 
already inside" (29). 
 Infinite Jest doesn't come with a warning label, yet many have suggested that 
reading IJ may be habit-forming (Cioffi). IJ is a novel about many different kinds of 
addiction, and at the same time it has the power to make its readers feel addicted to the 
book itself. It's not clear, when one reaches the end of the novel, exactly what has even 
happened. And/but to concentrate on IJ's meaning in search of a reconciliation, 
redemption, or reassembly of its fragmentary pieces into narrative whole is to close off 
the possibility of practicing reading otherwise. To keep reading requires a habit of 
reading through unreconciled contradiction, without the telos of redemption, by playing 
with all the available arrangements of the story's shatters. A habit of reading otherwise, I 
propose, results from the force of humility. Humility invites and demands that one alter 
one's disposition toward texts, producing by the force of habit a willingness to not know 
and not understand, but not to stop reading either. 
 IJ is a demanding read—mentally, emotionally, even physically. At 1,079 pages, 
including 388 "notes and errata," some of which go on for pages and some of which 
                                                                                                                                            
from nonserious, or fiction from nonfiction (75). The habit-forming qualities of Infinite Jest challenge such 
binary categories, although they are not simply collapsed into each other either. 
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themselves have notes (983), IJ in print has a heft of nearly two pounds. Acolytes hold IJ 
up as a virtuosic tour de force on what it means to be human, while its critics describe it 
as a showy, pretentious exercise in involuted postmodern literature.17 Both camps have 
agreed on the difficulty of simply getting through the novel, cover to cover. IJ epitomizes 
the obstinacy of long and challenging texts. At the same time, its intellectual profile and 
erudite reputation may tempt a reader to desire the mastery of having read it, the way a 
tall mountain might excite a certain desire to have climbed it. Still, many readers (I 
number among them) find themselves finishing the body of text (on page 981) only to 
turn back to page 1 and start again. It seems as if even the basic facts of the plot have 
escaped you. But still the feeling persists that truth and meaning have got to be there, in 
the text, in between the suggestive juxtapositions and subtle (and then conspicuous) riffs. 
If only you could read it again. 
 Although volumes have been devoted to tracking the threads of IJ's story, no 
single theory (no account of what happens) with enough explanatory power to establish a 
clear consensus has emerged in the twenty years since IJ's publication.18 The text fails to 
reveal a coherent narrative. IJ's failure to cohere is a performative failure, productive of 
an intense and prolonged practice of reading that exceeds not only the novel's 
fragmentation but even one's own desires and frustrations. Ronell makes the case in 
Stupidity that the failure to fully know "cannot be understood in terms of absence, 
                                                
17 For complaining reviews, see Peck and Kakutani. For devoted readers, fans, and scholars, see Burn, 
Carlisle, and Cohen and Konstantinou. 
18 Listserv Wallace-l (https://waste.org/mailman/listinfo/wallace-l) has hosted many of these debates and 
conversations; Greg Carlisle's volume Elegant Complexity is devoted to tracking the themes, images, and 
events of Infinite Jest. 
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default, or deficiency," because what's missing cannot simply "be filled, completed, or 
known by being brought out of its state of absence into unconcealedness" (101). The 
incompletion or interruption of meaning produces an interference with cognition that 
"itself calls for a reading" (101). IJ thereby renders the question of meaning 
indeterminable, and so it systematically exploits and disorients my reading habits. IJ both 
excites and thwarts the desire for addictive closure, and in so doing, it exposes the radical 
passivity of reading as well as the humility that conditions the possibility of response. 
 Infinite Jest, I maintain, is not only about recovering from addiction through 
humility, but it also produces that humility in some of its readers by making us feel 
ourselves to be addicted to a certain kind of reading: a reading aimed at finding closure, 
certainty, and resolution. But in frustrating the desires for closure, certainty, resolution, 
etc., IJ denies readers the satisfaction of completing the fix. It is precisely this denial that 
prompts readers to reread, repeating the structure of addiction—but also destructuring it, 
by installing habits of reading that pleasure in the failure to close, the uncertainty, the 
impossibility of resolution—habits that I treat as humility. 
 I begin by offering some context for my readers who are not yet readers of Infinite 
Jest. It would take pages to offer a thorough plot summary (and anyway, you always 
leave out of a summary that which you failed to understand), but I offer my own highly 
selective summary as a first hit of IJ's tropium—and the first fix is always free. I focus on 
a single problem of IJ's plot in order to demonstrate the text's resistance to interpretation. 
I connect this resistance to Ronell's work on reading in Stupidity. In the next section, I 
argue that the "reading habits" IJ develops in its readers constitute a kind of addiction to 
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reading. I articulate the mutual constitution of addiction and humility through the figure 
of "habit." In the final section, I argue that habit joins humility to addiction through a 
parasitic logic whereby humility defers the final closure of addiction and so exposes the 
rhetoricity of the subject addicted to tropium. 
 
ENTER THE TROPIUM DEN 
 Allow me to prepare the dose. Infinite Jest revolves around a film, also called 
"Infinite Jest," reputedly so pleasurable and engaging to view that all other bodily activity 
stops and viewers watch it on a loop until they die.19 The film's auteur, James 
Incandenza, dies under somewhat mysterious circumstances before the action of the 
novel begins (it appears that Jim killed himself by microwaving his own head, or perhaps 
he was actually murdered). While alive, Incandenza made genius-level contributions to 
several fields, spanning advanced optics and lenses, waste-driven energy production, and 
the pedagogy of junior competitive tennis. Incandenza's penultimate endeavor was the 
founding of Enfield Tennis Academy (or ETA) in Boston MA, followed by his final 
career in filmmaking. "Infinite Jest" is the last listed title in Incandenza's filmography 
(which occupies eight and a half pages in the novel's endnotes [985-993 n24]). 
 After Jim Incandenza's death, his wife Avril, a militant grammarian whose radical 
past includes shadowy ties to a group of Quebecois separatists, took over direction of 
ETA. Avril and Jim raised three sons, each of whom has resided at ETA. Orin, the oldest 
                                                
19 By convention in Wallace scholarship, Infinite Jest the novel is italicized and "Infinite Jest" the film 
appears in quotation marks. 
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son, is a serial seductionist who punts for the Arizona Cardinals. Mario, the middle son, 
was born with several physical disabilities and does not play tennis, but he is a part of the 
ETA community and he enjoys making films of his own. The youngest son, Hal, is a top-
rated junior competitive tennis player and all-around prodigy whose calamitous 
admissions interview with three University of Arizona deans opens the novel. 
 ETA sits atop a hill at the foot of which is located the Ennet House Drug and 
Alcohol Recovery House (1026 n143; Wallace's endnote marks the redundancy: "Sic."), a 
setting that juxtaposes the privilege and prestige of the academy with the humiliation and 
abasement of addiction. Don Gately, to whom Jim Incandenza (perhaps) ultimately 
appears as a wraith, is a recovering addict who joins Alcoholics Anonymous and stays on 
as staff at the halfway house after accidentally killing a Quebecois separatist in a botched 
robbery (the man, who was home sick with a sinus infection, could not breathe through 
his stuffy nose after Gately gagged him, and he suffocated). Finally but not totally, permit 
me to note that the Quebecois bear a deep grievance against the United States over a 
policy called Reconfiguration, whereby Canada was forced to absorb a chunk of land 
abutting Quebec that the United States ruined by launching its toxic waste there with 
giant catapults and unwittingly creating an alternating cycle of severe desolation and 
extreme verdant profusion (known as "annular fusion"). A fearsome group of wheelchair-
bound Quebecois assassins are seeking to obtain the master copy of "Infinite Jest," make 
duplicates, and disseminate them in an act of terrorism that would bring the American-
dominated Organization of North American Nations (known for the first 150 pages of the 
book only by its acronym, ONAN [36, 151]) to its knees. 
  35 
 As much as any of the novel's many mysteries can be said to be central, a central 
mystery is the question of who is sending out copies of the fatal "Infinite Jest." Readers 
might hope to rule out Jim Incandenza, who is dead, unless his (re)appearance as a wraith 
to addict Don Gately reveals some residual measure of agency in the world, which could 
explain the odd behavior of objects (appearing, moving, levitating) around ETA. One 
might suspect Incandenza's son Orin, who phones his brother Hal with suspicious 
questions about Quebecois separatism. Or one might indict the vicious Wheelchair 
Assassins, whose outposts in the American Southwest could, along with the postmark on 
one of the "Infinite Jest" copies, evidence their guilt. Although many of IJ's readers have 
turned their own theories into treatises on this question, no single answer can be 
forwarded without excluding alternative evidence and possibilities. The question of who 
is sending out copies of "Infinite Jest" is undecidable. Not indeterminate, not simply 
unclear for lack of evidence, but structurally dependent on that lack. 
 The logic that renders Jim, Orin, the Wheelchair Assassins, and even the wraith 
discrete subjects is interrupted and thwarted by persistent streams of connection. Jim, the 
film's auteur, invented the cycle of waste-fuel annularity that destroyed Quebec and 
inspired the Wheelchair Assassins. The film's only actress, Joelle van Dyne, is a film 
school dropout and Orin's one-time girlfriend, known before a facially destructive acid 
incident (that may not have happened) as the PGOAT, or the Prettiest Girl of All Time 
(290). Throughout the novel's action, Joelle wears a veil, but it's never made clear 
whether the veil's purpose is to hide disturbing facial scars or a literally overwhelming 
beauty that "Infinite Jest" may have captured on film. The web of connections gets denser 
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and denser through minor characters, shared locations, and repeated themes that don't 
reveal so much as they leave unconcealed the relations of intersection and force that 
encircle IJ's multitude of people and events. Joelle, an addict herself, meets and befriends 
Don Gately after moving into the halfway house; Gately, sometime after his encounter 
with the wraith, (possibly) meets Hal Incandenza in a Quebecois cemetery in order to dig 
up Hal's father's head, which head may contain the only duplicatable copy of Jim's 
"Infinite Jest." Hooked yet? 
 Avital Ronell closes "The Rhetoric of Testing" in Stupidity with this claim: "If 
there must be an imperative to understand, this is because understanding does not come 
but remains lost to us" (161). The imperative to understand IJ, to grasp its plot and 
resolve its mysteries, intensifies because understanding does not come. But the failure to 
understand is not the end of reading, especially when it comes to IJ; it's the beginning: 
"Reading involves the undoing of interpretive figures, to the extent that it questions 
whether any synthesis, any single meaning, can close off a text and adequately account 
for its constitution" (Ronell, Stupidity 104). Interpretation, as opposed here to reading, 
aims to reconcile the "constantly divergent" logic of a text's narratives, which in IJ spiral 
out like the cycles of annular fusion (104). The figural logic doesn't close; it opens 
infinitely in on itself like a fractal. In fact, in a 1996 interview Wallace compared the 
planned structure of IJ to a Sierpinski gasket, a fractal he described as "basically like a 
pyramid on acid" (Wallace, Interview). 
 Ronell's distinction between reading and interpretation lends itself well to an 
exposition of humility and the rhetoric of drugs. Interpretation, like addiction, promises 
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the subject who engages it an anaesthetizing feeling of mastery over "interference and the 
contingencies of textual disturbance" (Ronell, Stupidity 103). But this feeling comes at 
the cost of a missed encounter with "the stammers and stalls that reading . . . necessarily 
confronts" (103). Rather than deaden or drown out the "crucial dumbfoundedness" and 
"essential self-ignorance" of a text, Ronell argues, "reading enters the zone of 
nonunderstanding and tries at some level to manage the distress that the text releases" 
(103). Reading's management style is not a repressive one, Ronell contends, but rather 
"open" and "exposed" (103). The mark that distinguishes this Ronellian reading from 
addiction-interpretation is humility: openness, exposure, and vulnerability to the text's 
divergence, disruption, and destabilization. 
 If readers of IJ could be certain who was sending out copies of "Infinite Jest," or 
even of what exactly was in the film (all accounts of which in the novel are given 
secondhand and often under duress), the possibility of reading with humility would be 
foreclosed. Consider that no one in the novel who has viewed the film (with the possible 
exception maybe somehow of Hal) has been able to give up their addiction to watching 
the film. Is the film so satisfying to watch that watching it once immediately arouses a 
compulsive desire to watch it again? Or does the possibility of addiction actually depend 
on the impossibility of such utter satisfaction? "Infinite Jest" and IJ both solicit, provoke, 
and aggravate this desire for completion and totality. But IJ refuses ultimately to slake it. 
 Reading IJ is not a proving ground for one's intellectual prowess. One is denied 
the requisite pieces to assemble a complete picture of IJ's puzzles. Reading IJ can leave 
you feeling stupid. Ronell reminds us that "no matter how witty or presumably witless 
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one may be, . . . the battle of wits is a losing one, able to boast only provisional and 
recognizably pyrrhic victories" (Stupidity 100). No matter how much one may "hope to 
sharpen one's wits on subjective mastery," one will always be outwitted by "the brazen 
betrayals of linguistic positing" (100). A habitual humility is required to sustain this 
Ronellian reading. In order to clear a space for the practice of reading, one must become 
stupid. Reading is a practice: a reiterated effort to direct one's attention beyond the desire 
for a fix of interpretation. On the one hand, this reading won't make you smart: "One can 
only be dulled by repeated blows to the reading ego," Ronell warns (100). On the other, 
reading will make you smart, because absorbing those blows will sting: "Language 
smarts," Ronell tells us (100). 
 
READING HABITS 
 Habit is a crucial concept for making one's way through IJ. I want to develop this 
concept as a connection between addiction and humility. I begin with reference to Eve 
Sedgwick's "Epidemics of the Will," in which Sedgwick argues for thinking addiction in 
terms of habit rather than identity.20 Sedgwick uses the phrase "addiction attribution" to 
describe the expansion of addiction pathology to the point of nonexclusion: one can be 
addicted to anything, from alcohol and narcotics to coffee, exercise, junior competitive 
tennis, even AA meetings. Sedgwick argues that addiction poses a problem for the 
                                                
20 In a JAC article analyzing the percolation of Alcoholics Anonymous rhetoric throughout American 
culture, Karen Kopelson criticizes the simultaneous identitarianism and individualism of AA slogans. 
Although I am not interested here in defending AA (nor in conflating it with the AA of IJ), refiguring both 
humility and addiction in terms of habit could potentially offer another reading of AA that responds to the 
risk of neutralizing or replacing politics with therapy culture. 
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autonomous subject by presenting a tension between free will and this will's impairment. 
On the one hand, the addict is figured as free to choose sobriety; on the other, this choice 
is always "insufficiently pure," since the addict's will is compromised by the compulsion 
to use the addicting substance, whatever that substance may be (132). 
 This contradiction in what Sedgwick calls "the propaganda of free will" has the 
effect of keeping free will at the center of subjectivity even as it undermines the 
confidence one can have in the independence of the subject's voluntarity (133). Not 
unlike an addiction, demand for the substance "free will" is excited even as its returns are 
continually diminished. The alternative Sedgwick proposes to this "epidemic of the will" 
is habit, an understanding of "repeated action" that invokes many valences, from "the 
bodily habitus" to "the appareling habit" to "sheltering habitations" (138). Sedgwick 
(reading Proust) calls habit "a banal but precious opiate" (139), figuring habit itself as a 
drug that shapes perception or that, we might say, puts one in an altered state. I want to 
push the language of habit even further, to the point of breaking the binary Sedgwick 
identifies between voluntarity/compulsion: for both terms of the binary, a habit is being 
formed. The force of habit demonstrates the terms' mutual constitution. 
 Can one be addicted to reading? Infinite Jest provokes this question by calling its 
readers' attention to the ordinary behaviors we might call "reading habits." IJ also fleshes 
out the valences of this term, requiring that readers build new, unusual, or even bizarre 
habits to sustain their practice of reading. Literary critic Frank Cioffi argues that IJ both 
obsesses and alienates readers, making them feel like addicts. He suggests this 
"disturbing" experience is due in part to the dis- or reorganization of the ordinary actions 
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one takes in order to read. Some of the actions IJ requires readers to adopt may alter one's 
physical reading habits; for example, some readers use multiple bookmarks to aid in 
flipping between locations hundreds of pages apart. Carrying or holding the nearly two-
pound text presents its own challenges; one rarely forgets the physicality of the book. 
One reader found it convenient to cut the book's spine and take a few pages with him 
wherever he went. This habit then bore another, that of saving the book's flaking paper, 
string, and glue.21 Such ritual (and even secretive) reading habits have the effect of 
making a reader feel like an addict rather than an outsider. Readers are invited—or better, 
provoked—"to Identify" (in the language of IJ) rather than to think themselves exempt 
from the novel's many addictions.22 
 The feeling of being addicted to a two-pound novel is not easily accounted for, 
and I want to tarry with the account Cioffi gives in his article "'An Anguish Become 
Thing': Narrative as Performance in David Foster Wallace's Infinite Jest" because his 
essay is full of both insightful observations and near misses of explanation. Cioffi argues 
that IJ recruits its readers into the performance of the text, partly through its challenging 
and interesting prose and partly through its graphically violent or otherwise detailed 
emotional experiences; readers of IJ develop a divided consciousness, in a sense 
"performing" the text by staging their own experience of genuine emotional reaction. 
This claim implies that readers are also in a sense watching themselves perform. The 
                                                
21 See the blog Reading Infinite Jest (http://readinginfinitejest.blogspot.com). Posts from January 2009 
document the blogger's reading habits in sensuous and occasionally creepy detail. Note that maintaining a 
blog about one's reading habits then becomes one such habit. Dismembering IJ page by page (as well as 
collecting the book's physical debris) is a habit I too adopted, out of interest in altering my own reading 
habits—or perhaps instead this reading habit adopted me. 
22 On Identifying in IJ, see Wallace, Infinite Jest 345; see also Fitzpatrick 199. 
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reader is at once performer and passive spectator, not necessarily able to stop reading or 
recalling the "disturbing" scenes and feelings the text evokes (163). While Cioffi's 
argument resonates with my own feelings and experience of reading Infinite Jest, a fairly 
conservative figure of addiction dominates the analysis, occluding the possibility of 
reading with humility. I aim to recover this possibility, reading through and against 
Cioffi's formulation of addiction. 
 If there is something special about IJ, it would have something to do with both its 
excesses and its reflexivity.23 That is, Cioffi argues that the devices that distinguish IJ 
from novels in general (endnotes, the annotated scholarly filmography of a main 
character, abstruse medical and chemical jargon, lengthy sentences with tortured but 
grammatically correct syntax, and so on) may seem to be only "differences in degree" 
from other texts, but in IJ they become "differences in kind, and their sheer excess 
renders them more than just devices" (169). Cioffi hopes that calling the reading of this 
book a performance will account for its excesses and explain how this reading disturbs. 
But due at least partly to its excessive length, reading IJ is not an instance, not a single 
ephemeral act, but a habit, a repeated action that alters bodily habitus (dragging the thing 
around or slicing it down to size). As frustrating as the excessive use of "devices" like 
jargon or endnotes can be, each one installs delays in the unfurling of IJ's narratives that 
can make a reader aggressive about reading on. Reading IJ is habit-forming. 
                                                
23 I realize my hedging here may not be enough to offset the cult sensibility that frequently attends writing 
about Wallace's writing. Infinite Jest is special to me, a bias that ought to deepen rather than derail the 
inquiry into how one falls in love with language. What may be perceived as a "fanboy ethos" remarks a 
specific intoxication with Infinite Jest that could lead us to explore what about Wallace's writing seems to 
make writing itself so contagious. Fans, after all, share with addicts such characteristics as high-intensity 
enthusiasm, devotion, and even obsession. 
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 Perhaps one can imagine or even list other texts that exploit similar excesses in 
order to break open the genre of the novel and expose its guts, and IJ on this count may 
not be in a class by itself. Instead of asking "Can one be addicted to reading?" I could ask 
"Can one not be addicted?" Perhaps I could argue that the object of one's reading habits is 
endlessly substitutable: this chapter, that novel, those essays on rhetorical theory. In this 
sense all reading constitutes addiction, and any reading could be the dose that hooks you. 
But IJ does seem to sport a unique reflexivity when it comes to its readers' habits. 
Readers flip to the endnotes and back, producing a tennis-like volley of pages that tell a 
story about junior competitive tennis. If a tennis racquet weighs between ten and twelve 
ounces, readers of the two-pound IJ might as well be holding a racquet in each hand. But 
even more than tennis, IJ's stories are about addiction. 
 Readers of IJ must confront what Cioffi refers to as "the world of the addict, the 
complex rationalizations, the myriad humiliations, the refusal to see the future, the loss of 
physical/psychological integrity, the overpowering force of continual need" (170). 
Meanwhile, readers are forced to craft their own rationalizations for reading on (or giving 
up); face their own humiliation as they vainly search for definitions of a word that may 
not even be in the dictionary; live with their own refusal to acknowledge that even after 
hundreds of pages are turned, the storyline is not getting any clearer; cope with their own 
lost psychological integrity when everything they see turns their thoughts to Infinite Jest; 
and yield to the force of their own habitual need. You go back to the first page, looking 
for a fix, for answers you must have missed. You go back, feeling like an addict. 
 Crucially, you don't go back alone. IJ's reading habits establish a field of 
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relationships between and among readers of IJ.24 IJ is decidedly not a drama staged 
within the private theater of one reader's consciousness—and it couldn't be—nor could 
one reader's consciousness ever be simply private. The similarities between my 
experience of reading and Cioffi's, or mine and the reader who cut up his book, are 
striking. These reading habits echo each other. They may be personal, but they are not 
private. They establish a kind of relation between readers like the relation between people 
who grew up in the same town but never knew each other there (a relation which itself 
forms the basis for much of IJ's subtler collisions and near misses of plot). Cioffi argues 
that a reader's "performance" of the novel is both violative and addicting (177). Cioffi 
doesn't write about a community of readers; he's trying to make the case that a 
performance of one, even if only performed for that same one, is still a performance. The 
problem is that to be both your own performer and your own audience is to double 
yourself, to address yourself, and to be confronted with your own internal alterity—and 
not self-identity. 
 A reader is not alone with the book inside her own head. Exactly what makes IJ 
disturbing is the way its intoxicating influence transgresses what the reader had supposed 
to be the boundaries of her own consciousness, the way it obsesses what she thinks about 
when her mind wanders, or of what she is reminded in her life "outside" of the book. 
Writing about Joelle van Dyne once made me "decide" to buy sixty-four ounces of 
                                                
24 Kathleen Fitzpatrick's essay "Infinite Summer: Reading, Empathy, and the Social Network" analyzes in 
part the affective community that emerged among Wallace's readers through the 2009 Infinite Summer 
project (http://infinitesummer.org), an online reading group organized around weekly reading and daily 
blogging. Infinite Summer is one of several sites where Wallace readers find each other online, along with 
the Wallace-l listserv and Nick Maniatis's website, the Howling Fantods 
(http://thehowlingfantods.com/dfw). 
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unfiltered apple juice, which "decision" was only part voluntary, the better part 
compulsive, as if I were flashing back to not only my own but Joelle's tropium trip (cf. 
Wallace, Infinite Jest 228). One's reading habits for IJ don't stay confined to books. 
 In the margins of Crack Wars (literally—Ronell annotates her own text), Ronell 
echoes Derrida's "Rhetoric of Drugs," inscribing "What do we hold against the addict?" 
(102-103). Cioffi recirculates a commonplace answer: the problem with addiction—the 
reason why or the way in which it is so destructive—has to do with the isolation of the 
addict from social interaction (171). Cioffi suggests that the reading habit one develops 
for IJ is even akin to watching the fatal "Infinite Jest"—an absorption by which one 
"render[s] oneself numb to the external world"—and he lists some synonyms for being 
under the influence: "high," "buzzed," "stoned," and "whacked" (171). But recall that IJ's 
key mysteries revolve around the networks of manufacture and distribution of the novel's 
most addictive drug. Addiction requires the support of these (tropium) cartels; addicts 
must develop an intimate knowledge of their routes of access and cultivate these routes in 
order to sustain their addiction. As the addict needs the cartel, so reading always trips on 
other writing: reading Ronell is also reading Derrida, for example, and reading IJ isn't 
just ingesting Infinite Jest but also all the texts that IJ is on, and so on. Even addiction 
opens rather than isolates. 
 In Crack Wars, responding to Martin Heidegger, Ronell argues for thinking 
Being-on-drugs as a prior opening of the subject of Being to affection from the outside. 
Being-on-drugs exposes the route of access through which any drug enters the subject's 
interiority; in fact, this route of access in part defines the distinction between interior and 
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exterior. The foreign body finds passage to the inside through smoking, shooting, 
dropping—and reading. Reading addiction gives us to think the excessive sociality of the 
addict's exposure to text, to reading, and to addiction as such. Prior to any voluntary 
choice to expose oneself to affection, one is affected by an outside already inside. In this 
sense, one's reading habits expose a radical rhetoricity in reading, one that is also the 
condition of possibility for any addiction—even any altered state—in the first place. If 
the subject could be simply closed, independent, and autonomous, readers of IJ would 
never experience the identificatory feeling of addiction. 
 The Burkean commonplace that "identification is compensatory to division" 
(Burke 22) is reversed since, as Diane Davis has argued, "identification precedes not only 
any sense of identity but also, and therefore, any sense of divisiveness" (Inessential 
Solidarity 25). When the wraith finally appears to a nearly incapacitated Don Gately in 
the last (several hundred) pages of IJ, Gately (as well as readers) are no more or less sure 
of the wraith's actual presence or reality than of the doctors, friends, prosecutor, or AA 
sponsor who (maybe) visit Gately. Gately's internal monologue fills with "invasive-
wraith ghostwords," words Gately doesn't actually know, like "SINISTRAL" and 
"ANNULATE" and "LEVIRATEMARRIAGE" (922). These words break into Gately's 
mind with the "ghastly intrusive force" of wraith-induced suggestion (832). Gately, 
whose injured body offers no boundary or defense against the wraith's intrusion, wonders 
whether the wraith is part of Gately's Higher Power or is maybe part of the Disease, of 
addiction, here to make the case that Gately should accept the narcotic he's heretofore 
refused for the sake of his sobriety. Instead of asking how James Incandenza, a dead 
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person with whom Don Gately has no conscious or narrated social tie, gains (as the 
wraith) a profound suggestive influence over Gately, Davis and Ronell put us on the 
assignment of thinking the uncontrollable relationality that their exchange lays open. 
Perhaps it doesn't have to be Infinite Jest that exposes this rhetorical opening, this 
startlingly unguarded inroad to one's psyche that has actually always constituted one's 
(readerly) life. But it helps. 
 
INHABITING HUMILITY 
 I have argued that reading Ronell across Wallace's Infinite Jest can show us a 
view of humility we might otherwise miss: a humility that is habitual, that at once fixes 
for the totalizing force of addiction, but yet is answerable to the ethics of stupidity. 
Ronell's view of an ethical reading practice cultivates humility about one's mastery of text 
and the authority of interpretation. Infinite Jest cultivates an addictive reading habit, 
exciting the very desire for mastery that reading itself trips up and exposes. In this final 
section, I argue that humility and addiction are not simply opposites but are joined by 
habit and by the logic of parasitism. But humility also alters even addictive habits. 
Humility, I argue, constitutes a deferral of addiction's totalizing force, and in that deferral 
constitutes an opening onto the rhetoricity of the addict. 
 Ronell argues in Crack Wars that Being-on-drugs names the mode of an 
uncontrollable relationality. Why does the wraith only appear to Gately in his hospital 
room, at this crisis of addiction and recovery? Because, Ronell tells us, "Being-on-drugs 
indicates that a structure is already in place, prior to the production of that materiality we 
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call drugs" (Crack Wars 33). Since "anything can serve the function of a drug," any 
substance can fit into the structure of Being-on-drugs (53). This infinite substitutability is 
the cause of the crisis of compulsion and voluntarity described by Sedgwick. The domain 
of an independent autonomous subject that voluntarity is supposed to circumscribe is left 
open. In Inessential Solidarity, Diane Davis calls this openness to affection from outside 
"rhetoricity" (3). Davis argues that rhetoricity is an ability to be affected, or influenced, 
that both comes before and extends beyond the subject's engagement in signification. 
Rhetoricity is the uncontrollable relationality that defines Being-on-drugs. 
 Ronell refers repeatedly to "the promise of exteriority" that drugs extend: a 
fantasy of ecstasy or ek-stasis in which the addict's absorption in his substance is so total 
that he is taken outside himself (Crack Wars 50, 60, 61, 157). But there is already a fold 
in the logic that presumes a clean divide between the subject's interiority and exteriority. 
The outside is already inside. In Breaking Up [at] Totality, Diane Davis takes up Crack 
Wars in her argument that laughter marks a kind of intoxication of language. Davis notes 
that there's no simple alternative between this intoxication and a drug-free sobriety: "We 
have assumed an either/or structure and, therefore, the capacity to make an easy and clear 
distinction between the two" (73). Davis's argument echoes Derrida in "The Rhetoric of 
Drugs," where he argues that a "bad pharmakon can always parasitize the good 
pharmakon, bad repetition can always parasitize good repetition" (234). But addiction 
can't play the bad pharmakon if the good pharmakon is Being-on-drugs, because they 
parasitize one another. "Like any good parasite," Derrida continues, "it is at once inside 
and outside—the outside feeding on the inside" (234). Language itself is such a 
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pharmakon, such a parasite, argues Davis: "Language: an outside inside" (74). Language 
itself is a drug. 
 On this point, Davis, Ronell, and Derrida all agree, and Infinite Jest confirms the 
claim experientially: language is a drug. Can one be addicted to language? Davis and 
Ronell provoke us to ask whether one can Be any other way. Being, to be what it is, 
already trips on tropium. According to Ronell, Being-on-drugs requires a remodeling of 
Heideggerian Dasein (Crack Wars 34). In an essay that sorts through Heidegger's 
distinctions between willing, wishing, urge, and addiction, David Clark argues that "there 
is no metalanguage on addiction that is not itself already fundamentally 'addicted'" (9). 
Remarking on the habit of metaphorizing with drug paraphernalia, a habit demonstrated 
in his own writing (and indeed, in Ronell's writing, and David Foster Wallace's, and 
mine), Clark notes that "philosophical narratives about addiction have a habit of 
becoming evocatively pharmaceutical, that is, of getting caught up in everything that 
modernity associates with habituation and drugs" (10). These texts betray an intoxication 
with tropes that undermines their purity as philosophical texts, exposes them as already 
exposed, marks them as already rhetorical. Clark concludes that the "figures of addiction 
are complexly symptomatic of an 'addiction' to figures" (26). I'd drop the scare quotes. 
Language itself is addicting and addicted. 
 Ronell and Wallace tend to agree in their characterizations of addiction as a 
totalizing and destructive habit. Both make use of crack cocaine as the synecdoche for the 
addictive logic of chasing the dragon: after the first high, an addict needs to use more and 
more of a substance to reach an ever-diminishing high. Addiction "disappoints the 
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pleasure a drug might be expected to arouse," Ronell writes, but this disappointment only 
aggravates the addict's demand and dependence (25). Ronell calls crack a "pure instance 
of 'Being-on-drugs'" because "it is only about producing a need for itself " (25). Even the 
pleasure of the drug's use is siphoned off and replaced by addiction's self-replicating need 
for more of itself. 
 In Infinite Jest, Joelle van Dyne's crack cocaine addiction becomes so all-
consuming that she attempts to kill herself with a lethal overdose at a grad school friend's 
party. The account of Joelle's suicide plan spans twenty-one pages, interspersed with 
other stories' vignettes (219-240). Her elimination by addiction seems almost a foregone 
conclusion: "It was when her hands started to tremble during this part of the cooking 
procedure that she'd first known she liked this more than anyone can like anything and 
still live" (236). Now all that's left of the pleasure of her addiction is a blinding, persistent 
need. IJ articulates Joelle's predicament in this grim reflection: "What looks like the 
cage's exit is actually the bars of the cage. . . . The entrance says EXIT. There isn't an exit. 
The ultimate annular fusion: that of exhibit and its cage. . . . It is the cage that has entered 
her, somehow. . . . She's lost the ability to lie to herself about being able to quit, or even 
about enjoying it, still. It no longer delimits and fills the hole. It no longer delimits the 
hole" (222). Joelle can no longer make any distinction, to return to Sedgwick's language, 
between her own voluntarity and the addiction's compulsion. Addiction itself has eclipsed 
all the pleasure and desire that once fueled it. As in Crack Wars, addiction appears in IJ 
as a totalizing apparatus of control, one that can and will kill you. The question the 
remainder of this article explores is how humility makes use of an irrepressible 
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rhetoricity to turn an addictive habit toward a reading habit. 
 Through habit, humility parasitizes the structure of addiction. Humility defers the 
totality of addiction, substituting out the temporality of addiction for a temporality of 
waiting and prolonging. In Joelle's experience of "ultimate annular fusion," addiction has 
nearly entirely foreclosed on her—nearly, but not quite. The failure of her suicide attempt 
reads as the failure of addiction. Her substance offers a false promise of exteriority that, 
at its apogee, involutes on itself: the addiction is actually so thoroughly interiorizing that 
she is almost totally sealed off from anything exterior to the addiction. Joelle herself may 
not be able to delimit any part of herself not fully claimed by her drug habit, but there 
persists a kernel of alterity that resists the self-replication of addiction. Where habit 
verges into addiction, a space nevertheless remains open for inhabiting humility, for 
instituting an ethical distance and for turning being-on-drugs into being-beside-oneself. 
What keeps Joelle from eliminating her own map (see Wallace 1996a, 220) is the very 
thing that almost kills her: that very addiction and absorption in a substance that opens 
onto the outside. That is rhetoricity; that is Joelle's Being-on-drugs. Being addicted to 
reading Joelle's story in IJ at once exposes and displaces one's own exteriority. You may 
want to identify, but you are not at the center of her story. 
 Some say that the AA program works (if it works) by replacing one habit with 
another. Ronell: "To get off drugs, or alcohol . . . , the addict has to shift dependency to a 
person, an ideal, or to the procedure itself of the cure" (Crack Wars 25). Certainly the 
AAers who populate IJ aren't "sober," strictly speaking—they drink coffee by the 
industrial carafe, smoke cigarettes even in their sleep. But Being-on-drugs implies that 
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there is no such thing as the "sobriety" of not being under any influence at all: that kind 
of hermetic insulation from affection would imply not being at all. To be totally free of 
the influence of a foreign body would require the subject to be also totally free from the 
possibility of that influence. It would require the subject to close every route of exposure 
that connects her interiority with the possibility of affection from outside. It isn't an 
option to "just say no," since this saying would already be a response, conditioned on a 
prior "yes" that opens the line.25 In IJ, the habit that replaces addiction does its work by 
exploiting habit, inclining it toward humility instead of addiction. We might call this 
habit recovery as opposed to sobriety. In IJ, recovery is about conceding that your 
particular addictive substance has always got you hooked, already made you vulnerable 
to it. Recovering addicts may not be using, but they are still definitionally exposed to the 
influence of their substance. 
 An addict takes up humility (if it gets taken up) through habit, in response to 
humility's call. In The Telephone Book, Ronell argues that one comes into Being humbly, 
not through autonomy or voluntarity, but first in response to a call. "Don't delude 
yourself," she cautions. "Being is yours only to the extent that you cannot shirk this 
responsibility; it is your duty, you are nothing before being" (71-72). But paradoxically, 
the humility of being responsible also singles one out through the granting of an 
"immoderately obliging assignment" (72). Ronell continues: "Being, finally, is nothing 
other than this duty that calls you, possesses and debits you, guiltifies you from the 
                                                
25 In "A Number of Yes," Jacques Derrida argues that this prior "yes" is "presupposed as the condition of 
possibility for all other performatives," that is, for all other responses, affirmations or negations (129). 
Derrida also traces the thread of this unconditional "yes" through an unraveling of "willing" into "nonwill," 
opening still another avenue toward deconstructing voluntarity/compulsion. 
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moment you are—you, the Unique, the Called" (72). I told you IJ was speaking to me. 
But I also said I can't be sure of what I think I've heard, or whether it was addressed to 
me. This writing is my own uncontrollable relationality: a responding I can't simply shut 
off. 
 IJ's Don Gately leaves his shoes and keys way under his bed at night so that in the 
morning, he has to get down on his knees to reach them again. This bodily habit of 
humbling himself, like other bodily routines, actually constructs and produces belief—we 
might call habit a belief before belief.26 In Gately's case, as he is advised by multiple 
AAers, it matters less that he feels himself to really believe than that he acts as if he 
believes regardless of how he feels or how he believes himself to believe (Wallace, 
Infinite Jest 466-468). What Gately primarily needs out of believing in and praying to a 
Higher Power is not the belief itself nor the symbolic guarantee that his Higher Power 
can or even will do anything to help him (which he doesn't at first believe)—in fact, 
precisely not those things—but the habitual practice of the belief, which helps enable him 
to remain in recovery, open to the influence of his addiction rather than attempting to seal 
himself off from its affection. The habits that keep Gately sober do so because they 
constitute a practice of humility: by kneeling to pray, Gately enacts the AA admission 
that "My Best Thinking Got Me Here"—that is, that his own autonomous judgment and 
beliefs are already compromised, already part compulsion and so not pure voluntarity. 
                                                
26 In her book Toward a Civil Discourse, Sharon Crowley borrows this phrase from Slavoj Žižek. Crowley 
argues that a "belief before belief" names the kind of embodied belief that is often learned by "adopting 
bodily positions, making gestures, and performing movements"—or we could say learned by passionate 
commitment rather than (or prior to) intellectual commitment (69). Crowley notes that "beliefs acquired in 
any of these ways become habitual through repetition" (69). 
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Surrendering his judgment to the program, or to a solidarity without identity,27 doesn't 
actually rehabilitate his judgment. He will never stop being an addict. But perhaps in 
spite of his every certainty to the contrary, it's the surrendering and the submission that 
works—if it works (Wallace, Infinite Jest 351, 1026 n135). Gately's habits affirm the 
rhetoricity, the exposedness to influence from outside that structurally underlies his 
addiction. But by inhabiting humility, he exploits addiction's structure of exposure toward 
something otherwise than addiction. 
 At the beginning of recovery, at a conjunction of addiction and exposure like 
Joelle's failed suicide attempt, one can say only that a decision takes place. It belongs to 
humility to find a way to issue its call. You can't be certain that it is really meant for you. 
But that is the essence of humility: in the midst of no clarity, no certainty, no assurance of 
your adequacy, you respond. You read, then you read again, prolonging your approach 
toward the limit but opening the possibility of still another reading, another saying, 
another tropium trip. Heidegger famously argued that language is the house of Being 
(239, 254). Revising Heidegger with Ronell, we might say that language is the house of 
Being-on-drugs. Reading Infinite Jest opens the house to anyone who responds when 
humility calls. Revising again, we might say that language is the halfway house of Being-
on-drugs. It is the site of the practice of recovery, the inhabiting of humility, and above 
all the repetition of reading again. Rhetoricity, the exposedness in language on which this 
calling (and responding) first depends, is what keeps the line open, inviting us to keep 
listening.  
                                                
27 For more on this distinction and its uses, see chapter 3. 
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Chapter 2: Sensitive Students 
 
The perversion and pervertibility of this law (which is also a law of hospitality) is that 
one can become virtually xenophobic in order to protect or claim to protect one's own 
hospitality, the own home that makes possible one's own hospitality. (53) 
— Jacques Derrida, Of Hospitality 
 
Student-desire as Godzilla, our curriculum as Tokyo. 
— Geoffrey Sirc, "Writing Classroom as A & P Parking Lot" 
 
 This chapter examines the public debate that ensued when students at several 
universities and colleges in the US advocated for the use of trigger warnings in their 
college classes. Briefly, a trigger warning is a designation that warns a reader that the text 
they are about to read could be destabilizing, and this designation is often accompanied 
by an indicator of a specific issue, such as "rape" or "suicide." Readers who might be 
sensitive to mentions, discussions, or graphic descriptions of those issues are alerted to 
their presence in the text in advance of reading so that they will not be caught off guard. 
In the middle of the 2013-2014 academic year, two proposals to adopt the use of trigger 
warnings in college classes were introduced: one, by the staff in the Office of Equity 
Concerns at Oberlin College, which suggested trigger warnings as a possible 
accommodation for students dealing with trauma related to sexual assault, and the other, 
by student senate resolution at the University of California in Santa Barbara, which 
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would have required instructors to list trigger warnings on their syllabi ("Support 
Resources"; "A Resolution to Mandate"). 
 The time of controversy over trigger warnings is oddly out of joint. In December 
2013, Slate published an article declaring 2013 "The Year of the Trigger Warning" 
(Marcotte).28 But strangely, it was the year that followed that was crammed with more 
iterations of jeremiads against trigger warnings than one can count. In her keynote at the 
Computers and Writing conference in June 2014—barely halfway through the year—
Melanie Yergeau mentions her review of around 50 articles about trigger warnings. In 
2014, Entries into the debate over trigger warnings were published at The New Republic, 
Salon, The Guardian, The LA Times, The New York Times, Mother Jones, as well as at 
The Chronicle of Higher Education and Inside Higher Ed (Jarvie; Frank; Neutill; 
Filipovic; Goldberg; Medina; Drum; Kipnis; Wilson; 7 Humanities Professors). The 
majority of these trigger warning op-eds were not penned by college teachers, though 
several significant contributions were. It would stand to reason that students and their 
teachers have the most at stake in this debate. Although few (if any? none?) colleges have 
a policy requiring instructors to use trigger warnings,29 arguments against them are still 
both frequent and impassioned. A September 2015 piece in the Chronicle called trigger 
warnings a part of "the gravest threat" facing the university today (Bass & Clark): that is, 
                                                
28 The Slate article cites a post on the feminist blog Shakesville that raises the question, from an instructor's 
point of view, of how to sensitively negotiate potentially traumatizing topics in class without singling out 
vulnerable students (Looft). 
29 In 2015, Modern Language Association members were informally surveyed by the National Coalition 
Against Censorship. Of 808 respondents, 0.5% said their institution had adopted a trigger warning policy 
(Kingkade). The survey concluded that there is "no crisis, but deep concern" about trigger warnings 
(National Coalition Against Censorship). 
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a threat to academic freedom posed by the sensitivity of our students. 
 The commonplaces that circulate in so many op-eds against trigger warnings are 
articulated (that is, joined together as well as expressed) with one another through an 
ideological objection to sensitivity.30 I will inventory the forms this non- or in-sensitivity 
takes further on. First, I want to situate sensitivity as an excessive signifier in the trigger 
warnings debate, a signifier that calls for more sustained attention than it has heretofore 
received. The accusation of oversensitivity pricks my rhetorician's ears because it 
bespeaks an exposedness or vulnerability to affection in language. If as a child you 
learned the rhyme, "Sticks and stones may break my bones, but words will never hurt 
me," you were probably learning to contrast the harm that language can do with the harm 
of physical violence, and so to minimize the effectivity of words to do violence. But 
words can and do hurt. Jacques Derrida, Judith Butler, Avital Ronell & others have 
argued that being called a name is the first wound or opening of existents in language.31 
In order to respond to that being called, one must first of all be sensitive, not simply able 
to hear a call (since strictly speaking one is not yet there to hear this first call), but unable 
to not be affected by this calling. Sensitivity is a radical passivity which precedes the 
agentive choice to open or close oneself to affection from outside: it is a telephone wire 
that delimits the rhetorical subject.  
 Thinking of sensitivity in this framework will change the way we read the debate 
                                                
30 Sharon Crowley defines the tissue of articulation as ideologic: "connections made between and among 
moments (positions) that occur or are taken up within ideology" (Toward a Civil Discourse 60). 
31 See Derrida, On the Name; Butler, Excitable Speech; Precarious Life; Avital Ronell, The Telephone 
Book. 
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over trigger warnings. For one, it will help us take notice in each instance of the way 
accusations of oversensitivity are deployed, and it will open the question that's been 
shunted aside: why? What service has sensitivity been pressed into, and for what purpose, 
in the debate over trigger warnings? In other words, why is this debate so severely 
overblown? In the second place, thinking of sensitivity as a condition of possibility for 
the rhetorical subject gives us a prism for refracting arguments against trigger warnings 
into an inquiry into why these arguments can be so hurtful, what gets covered over by the 
bad feelings they can generate, and how such arguments nevertheless expose the very 
sensitivity they set out to disavow. The question this chapter investigates is what service 
sensitivity has been pressed into for this debate, and what its deployment as a trope 
ascribed to students covers over, even in the scramble to protect the academic values that 
make a home for critical work in the academy. 
 To speak of a "debate" over trigger warnings is to project a false image of two 
equal and opposing sides, when in fact there are multiple asymmetric parties to the 
controversy, and many competing beliefs available even to those who share the same 
position. Before I ask you to absorb the details of the arguments in circulation, I want to 
first report on the stakes for both critics of trigger warnings and for the student activists 
who have advocated for them. Among critics of trigger warnings, there's little 
disagreement that the most important value at stake is academic freedom. Specifically, 
critics of trigger warnings have argued that requiring instructors to use trigger warnings 
impinges on their freedom to select readings, design assignments, and assemble syllabi 
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independently.32 (Requiring would be a key word here: of the two institutional proposals 
to adopt trigger warnings that made headlines in recent years, only the UCSB student 
senate resolution would have required them; of course, the resolution would have to have 
been adopted by an institutional body with binding authority for faculty to be truly 
required to use trigger warnings.) The debate over trigger warnings invokes unstated 
beliefs about the scope of academic freedom, respective to whether and how this partly 
legal, partly academic-folk doctrine extends to what college teachers may teach, as well 
as how they teach it.33 Some fear that students would use trigger warnings as an invitation 
to skip a reading, film, or class, perhaps to insulate themselves from exposure to ideas or 
beliefs with which they personally disagree.34 These critics fear that untenured and 
adjunct faculty would be exposed to increased complaints about their teaching made by 
students to administrators, which could put their jobs in jeopardy. Scholars whose writing 
and teaching critiques hegemonic norms would be especially vulnerable to conservative 
scrutiny and targeting. 
 Of course, such scholars already are especially vulnerable to conservative scrutiny 
                                                
32 Of course, there are already limits on this freedom. For example, a question now pending at California 
State University Fullerton poses whether a faculty member may assign a different (and cheaper) textbook 
than the one sanctioned by the department (Jaschik, "Can a Professor be Forced to Assign a $180 
Textbook?"). The American Association of University Professors has stated that departments do have some 
authority over text selection, especially where multiple sections of a course are taught by several 
instructors.  
33 In Versions of Academic Freedom, Stanley Fish argues that the competing interpretations of academic 
freedom have inflated a doctrine which should be confined to one's disciplinary expertise. 
34 Of course, students don't need to use trigger warnings as a pretext in order to assert a right to refuse 
materials they find offensive. In the case of University of Utah, a lawsuit settlement required the university 
to adopt a formal "content accommodation" policy, which allows students to request alternatives if they 
believe a course requirement violates their religious beliefs. The policy also allows instructors to deny such 
requests if the requirement "has a reasonable relationship to a legitimate pedagogical goal" ("Policy 6-
100"). 
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and targeting, as was Steven Salaita when in 2014 tweets critical of state violence in 
Israel apparently prompted the University of Illinois to attempt to revoke his hiring 
contract, and as was Saida Grundy when in 2015 a tweet critical of white masculinity 
became the center of a right-wing media firestorm. It is tempting to write, "Academic 
freedom has been under attack," but this metaphor reinscribes a Manichean 
freedom/terrorism opposition that has underwritten many such "attacks," such as those of 
academic concern-troll David Horowitz. Many a state legislature is hard at work to 
undermine faculty governance and eliminate tenure in state universities. Adjuncts and 
graduate students do not have the same freedom to select texts and assemble syllabi that 
tenured faculty do. In the era of the corporate university, college teachers, it may seem, 
are more vulnerable than ever before. And, in the midst of pandemic gun violence on 
campuses and its specific variants, school shootings and anonymous threats of school 
shootings, state laws in Texas and elsewhere will allow licensed students to bring literal 
loaded guns to class. Threats to academic freedom and to its practice in college 
classrooms are not in short supply. 
 But for students, especially those who have advocated for trigger warnings, the 
practice of academic freedom in the classroom is inseparable from accessibility. "Being 
triggered" means in mental health literature experiencing an emotional and/or physical 
disruption in one's cognitive process in response to a prior experience of trauma. When a 
person is triggered, symptoms of trauma and common responses to trauma may impinge 
on one's ability to focus. Symptoms can include "types of hyperarousal such as increased 
heart rate, sweating, difficulty breathing, cold sweats, tingling, muscular tension; 
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constriction of the nervous system and digestive system; dissociation and/or dysphoria; 
feeling numb, spacing out, or fully blacking out.... hyper vigilance, sensitivity to light and 
sound, difficulty sleeping, a reduced capacity to manage stress and anxiety, amnesia and 
forgetfulness, chronic fatigue, immune system problems, headaches, and diminished 
ability to bond or connect with other individuals" (Carter; Levine). A triggered student is 
not in a state of mind or body conducive to learning. When students request trigger 
warnings from their instructors, they are asking that their courses be made more 
accessible. Trigger warnings are designed to enable readers to prepare for the possibility 
of being triggered, and to take measures to reduce the disruption being triggered would 
cause. Avoiding potentially triggering material is not always possible, in a classroom or 
in any other environment. Trigger warnings could, sometimes, make it possible for 
students to encounter a trigger without being destabilized by it. It is important that people 
living with trauma choose for themselves whether and when to face triggers, since having 
no warning can make the trigger harder to confront. Being triggered can be damaging for 
a student's mental and physical health, and students who are triggered might miss out on 
more than a single text, film, class period, or course in order to cope and recover 
(Simpkins and Orem). 
 
ACCESS IS NOT SAFETY: TRIGGERING AS HARM 
 Using trigger warnings does not eliminate the possibility that students may be 
triggered. As Kathleen Ann Livingston argues in "On Rage, Shame, 'Realness,' and 
Accountability to Survivors," trigger warnings should be viewed as one potential tool of a 
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trauma-informed pedagogy. Livingston reminds us that trauma survivors have not only 
divergent but at times conflicting needs. Such conflicts must be negotiated. If teachers do 
nothing, we are likely to reproduce the ambient norms of academic culture, norms that 
shut out students with mental disabilities and mental illness (Price). Students who have 
advocated for the use of trigger warnings are asking to negotiate the norms and classroom 
practices of their courses. Every public space, every space of discussion, especially 
college classes, already has a great many sometimes contradictory or competing norms 
about what is appropriate and what is off limits. Trigger warnings cannot simply 
disappear such norms, but instead they offer a possible strategy for making these norms 
explicit, negotiable, and consensual rather than tacit, incontestable, and individual to a 
teacher, cohort, or institution. Trigger warnings will not always be the right fit, and there 
may be other ways of opening a conversation with our students about creating a class 
that's accessible to the students in the room. But it is precisely that accessibility that's at 
stake for our students. 
 Accessibility is not the same thing as safety, as Angela Carter argues in "Teaching 
with Trauma: Trigger Warnings, Feminism, and Disability Pedagogy." By 
conceptualizing trauma through the lens of disability, Carter argues for an expanded 
category of neurodivergence, including "people who may never receive a medical 
diagnosis, or clinical recognition as such" in the scope of students for whom access is an 
issue and not a given. But Carter also argues that conflating access with safety 
"illustrate[s] a prevailing fundamental lack of awareness about disability, access, and 
accommodation in higher education." She insists on a distinction between "experiences of 
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re-traumatization or being triggered" and "being challenged outside of one's comfort 
zone, being reminded of a bad feeling, or having to sit with disturbing truths," and rightly 
so. Trauma is not the same as taking offense or even being harmed by another's injurious 
speech.   
 Diane Davis has called this inability to close oneself off from another's affection 
rhetoricity. According to Davis, a "responsibility to respond, a preoriginary rhetorical 
imperative, is the condition for any conscious subject rather than the other way around" 
(106). Drawing on the work of Emmanuel Levinas, Davis argues that the obligation to 
respond to the address of another actually structures subjectivity, where the subject or "I" 
in language comes into being already in response to the other's affection. This 
response/ability, or responsibility, is only possible because, prior to one's constitution as a 
subject, one is already open (or exposed) to the affection of the other—even though "I" 
am/is not properly there yet to hear it. Nevertheless, "I" am exposed to address, and this 
exposure is not something the subject is even around to choose, but rather a condition of 
"my" possibility as a subject. So before "I" ever show(s) up as a subject, already "I" am 
exposed beyond my ability to close myself off from the other's affection. First of all, "I" 
am sensitive. 
 In Otherwise Than Being, Emmanuel Levinas defines sensibility as "being 
affected by a non-phenomenon" (75). The language of ability seems to imply a capacity 
to be affected that precedes (and underwrites) the subject in language. To paraphrase, we 
might say this sensibility is so delicate that it "detects" or responds even to an absence, a 
non-phenomenon, a call or address that one may or may have heard. Responding to an 
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affection that may not be there: it would seem Levinas's sensibility could resonate with 
the accusation that one is being too sensitive, oversensitive, hypersensitive. But 
sensitivity describes a slightly different arc than sensibility. Strictly speaking, the 
hyperdetection or hyperresponse Levinas describes is not an ability at all. It is rather a 
kind of trauma: It is an incapacity or inability to stop oneself from being affected. 
Sensitivity is not a power, but a nonpower marked by vulnerability and radical passivity. 
Sensitivity is a rhetorical receptivity that makes address possible. It is a structural 
opening into (and prior to) the subject through which affection from exteriority enters—
not against our will but before it. Reading sensitivity in this way would change the way 
we argue about trigger warnings, about trauma, and about student activism. Instead of 
simply waiving along the derogative implications attached to sensitivity when it is 
deployed as an accusation, which are thoroughly politicized in terms of gender, race, and 
ability, we can call a halt to the derogation. We can take up rhetorical sensitivity as the 
site of a shared vulnerability, an exposure to one another's affection in language that 
implicates us all in an ethical question of responsibility.  
 Without this rhetorical view of sensitivity, the arguments that are in circulation 
over trigger warnings might make sense as commonplaces that are articulated in defense 
of academic freedom. When I weave the commonplaces all together, I see an argument 
that runs something like this: 
The popular history of trigger warnings narrates their emergence from feminist 
blogs to social media sites, namely Tumblr, and from there to college classes. 
Students are the hosts responsible for the transmission of trigger warnings from 
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"the feminist blogosphere" to the previously uncontaminated space of college. 
Young people are the beneficiaries of generations of feminist activism, and while 
previous generations of activists sustained real damage, this generation has 
learned to elevate every loss and injury to the level of trauma. Trigger warnings 
are not advocated by real activists, but by young people who confuse being 
traumatized with being offended, and who criticize others by calling them out for 
perceived offenses. The performance of outrage replaces real activism, fracturing 
what should be a coalition of shared political interests with the distraction of 
infighting and internal critique. In the real world, which is not the feminist 
internet, social media, or college, even millennials will not be shielded from 
trauma: so students should not be shielded, either. After all, triggers can be 
anything, even smells. Some people might object to strong odors like perfume, or 
smoke. Putting a warning on every possible trigger is therefore a potentially 
limitless task. Students with real disabilities should seek accommodations through 
their university's student services. But also, students should not rely so much on 
the individual, medical model of trauma since it elides systemic and structural 
violence. Such violence is omnipresent, and no space can ever be made totally 
safe from it. Students should learn how to deal with things that are hurtful or 
offensive. They should develop a sense of humor and learn to take a joke. 
Demanding that instructors cater to students' needs reflects the entitled attitude of 
a consumer. Instructors should make decisions about teaching according to their 
judgment as scholars, free from the influence of student demands. Nothing would 
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stop students from claiming to be traumatized by teaching about privilege and 
systemic violence, so faculty whose work deals with such issues would be more 
vulnerable to student complaints. 
 But thinking differently about sensitivity may dissolve the ideologic that connects 
these premises. Perhaps you think of yourself as sensitive, or you feel that sensitivity can 
be a good quality, or for some other reason, sensitivity resonates differently with you than 
with its critics. If so, then the intensity of the fear of sensitive student can make the 
critiquing them sound hollow. In a 2015 blog post called "Against Students," feminist 
scholar Sara Ahmed traces out the figure of the problem student, analyzing how different 
variations of this figure are used to minimize, dismiss, and undermine the political 
positions of students. Most relevant to this discussion is the variant Ahmed calls the 
oversensitive student, "the one who responds to events or potential events with hurt 
feelings." Even as I revise this chapter, the figure of the oversensitive student seems to be 
on the rise, appearing in more debates about other campus issues, especially in the wake 
of student protests over racism at Yale and the University of Missouri.35 This figure of 
the oversensitive student draws on and activates related raced and gendered tropes that 
further marginalize the advocacy and interests of the people these tropes target (the angry 
black woman [Tomlinson]; the feminist killjoy [Ahmed, The Promise of Happiness]; the 
lazy, faking disabled person aka "Somnolent Samantha" [Yergeau]). The backlash against 
students is of a piece with a backlash against sensitivity. For the past several years, it has 
                                                
35 And in the wake of dozens of other campuses protests and meetings focusing on Black student life, and 
in student activism against rising tuition and fees at universities and colleges around the world. The figure 
of oversensitive students also appears in the debate over campus carry laws, especially in the aftermath of 
an ongoing school shooting and mass shooting epidemic. 
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been recirculated and amplified in a reactionary echo-chamber, and what makes it 
striking is the alliance of opinion between conservatives like Jonah Goldberg and Greg 
Lukianoff and leftist humanities scholars like participants in the Entropy Magazine 
roundtable on trigger warnings, Jack Halberstam and Lisa Duggan writing at Bully 
Bloggers, or the 7 Humanities Professors of Inside Higher Ed (Lukianoff and Haidt; 
Milks; Halberstam, "You are Triggering Me!"; 7 Humanities Professors). The backlash 
against sensitivity structures what it is possible to say, and has bound and constrained 
what can be said even by feminist scholars, and contorted those available means into 
attacks against students. Why is this critique of sensitivity gaining purchase and 
proliferating now? Why has it attached to college students? 
 Critiques of sensitive students postulate that students are outsiders to academic 
life, interlopers against a culture that students themselves are already saying is hostile to 
them. Another way of saying the same thing: Some students are not at home in the 
university.36 At least since the wave of student activism in the 1960s, students in the US 
have posed as a question whether the university can be a place that welcomes them, a 
place of hospitality. I argue that this question has to remain open, that it is, each time we 
teach or convene, the site of a decision, which is to say, of an undecidable obligation in 
the face of which a decision nevertheless takes place. In the trigger warning debate, the 
knee jerk reaction against sensitive students closes the question of hospitality, 
territorializing the classroom as a space where freedom belongs to the instructor (only) 
                                                
36 An incident at Yale over the Halloween weekend in 2015 revolved precisely around the fact that 
students of color who live on campus in residences administrated by professors are still not at home in the 
university. 
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and the role of students is not to be welcomed but to decrease their own resistance / obey. 
What has made feminist scholars and tenured professors feel so at home—or perhaps, so 
not at home—that the activism of our students is felt as an assault? What makes us 
unwilling or unable to welcome our students, strangers though they may be, into the 
university / institution? We must know we are not simply at home in the university: we 
must know the special torsion exerted by the institution on those of us most outside of its 
norms, a torsion which aims to draw us into alignment with it. Following Jacques 
Derrida, we must observe that our defense of academic freedom and of our right to access 
this institution and even of our right to open it to those we see being excluded from it is 
always at risk of becoming xenophobic in defense of the own home that makes 
hospitality possible, even equally violent as the exclusions we seek to correct.  
 If we take a rhetorical view of sensitivity to the problematic of hospitality that 
student advocacy for the use of trigger warnings has opened, we may see certain 
arguments differently. The next sections of this chapter aim to perform a re-reading of the 
trigger warning debate in order to expose this sensitivity as a condition of possibility 
being affected or addressed in a rhetorical relation. I'll focus on a select few of the 
arguments against trigger warnings that were written by college teachers: Jack 
Halberstam's post on Bully Bloggers, "Trigger Warnings are Flawed" published on Inside 
Higher Ed by "7 Humanities Professors," and the Entropy Magazine roundtable on 
trigger warnings, which included writing instructors. These arguments share a framework 
in which the value of academic freedom is asserted in the form of a right to hurt others. 
Quite intelligibly, this right is reserved by scholars who work to critique hegemonic 
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norms, and who know all too well that such critiques are frequently received as (or shut 
down for) offending normative sensibilities. But by looking at sensitivity as a rhetorical 
trope that structures the debate about trigger warnings, I want to demonstrate that while it 
is certainly possible to rebuke, regulate, and punish those uses of language that offend, 
it's actually impossible to threaten the relation which makes hurt or harm possible. If 
sensitivity describes an exposedness to one another in language that conditions the 
possibility for all existents to come into being, then it is never really possible to sever this 
connection, or block up this route of affection from the outside: one is always sensitive, 
and the "best" we can do is bury the mutuality of our exposedness, installing ourselves as 
authorities, experts, police, judges, or teachers, knowers, positioned as immune to or 
exempt from subjection to another's affection. 
 
TEACHING AT THE SCENE OF TRAUMA 
 Some critics of trigger warnings have argued what constitutes a "trigger" is not 
harmful in itself, but only a representation of trauma. A trigger is defined as a 
representation, words or an image or any signifier, that sets off someone's response to a 
prior experience of trauma by causing them to remember and even relive that experience. 
The premise that underlies this argument is that sensitive students respond 
inappropriately to representations of violence: A text that some students may consider 
triggering is merely a text, and being exposed to such texts cannot do any real trauma.  
 There are several ways to read this claim. One might counter that words and 
representations can do violence. Judith Butler sorts this through J. L. Austin's theory of 
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performativity in her book Excitable Speech.37 Butler holds that in order for humans to be 
hurt by language, we must be vulnerable to it somehow. Butler's account of this 
vulnerability is that we are constituted in language. We are made to exist as social being 
through language; interpellated by having been called a name in language. Even the 
body, Butler argues, its gestures, its habits, its hexis are made to exist by and through 
social interpellation. Butler argues that language injures when and because it exposes the 
body of the addressee as vulnerable to address. Injurious language exposes our exposition 
to language itself. 
 Another approach would focus on the working definition of a "trigger." Being 
triggered entails an emotional and/or physical disruption in one's cognitive process. 
While such disruptions could be viewed as inappropriate responses to mere 
representations of trauma, many in mental health fields and in disability studies view 
being triggered as "re-traumatization" (Carter). The cognitive disruption means that a 
person who has been triggered has in some sense withdrawn from the experience of being 
triggered; we could argue that being triggered is not an experience at all. Trauma is not 
graspable, not experienced as such, not limited in its effectivity to representation because 
trauma is not representable; not available to typical cognitive meaning-making. Rather 
than construing a trigger as a representation subject to a process of interpretation, we 
could understand the experience of being triggered as a repetition of trauma, that is, as a 
                                                
37 Butler is careful to distinguish, though, between harm that results from language (perlocutionary effects) 
and harm that is accomplished by and through language (illocutionary effects). An illocution is a speech act 
that accomplishes the thing it also announces. Butler contends that for someone to be wounded by words, 
the speech act must be perlocutionary. Austin pointed out that one doesn't hurt someone else by announcing 
it, as in an illocution, i.e. "I humiliate you!" Eve Sedgwick challenges and complexifies this view with her 
analysis of the performativity of shame, as in the illocution, "shame on you" (Touching Feeling). 
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rupture in experience itself, as a non-experience by which the process of signification is 
derailed rather than simply directed to another track. In this case a trigger is not a 
constative, not a description/representation that points to some other referent in the world, 
but a performative.38 Thinking of a trigger as a performative rather than a constative 
changes its relationship to trauma from one of indirect reference (constative) to one of 
synonymy. To be triggered is not just to be reminded of a prior wound, but to be 
wounded again. 
 A third reading may connect the premise that triggers are not really harmful to the 
view that students of this generation have been spared the more real or legitimate 
violence and trauma that earlier generations underwent. For example, Jack Halberstam 
argues that "being queer no longer automatically means being brutalized" ("You are 
Triggering Me!").39 With some hyperbole, Halberstam claims students of "the triggered 
generation" paradoxically demand to be provided safety from overstated harms. Students 
are "accustomed to trotting out stories of painful events in their childhoods (dead 
pets/parrots, a bad injury in sports in college applications and other such venues," 
Halberstam contends. Sensitive students "have come to think of themselves as 
communities of naked, shivering, quaking little selves—too vulnerable to take a joke, too 
                                                
38 This distinction between constative and performative language is one introduced by philosopher J. L. 
Austin in the series of lectures that became How To Do Things With Words. Austin introduced a sea of 
classifying terms, including "felicity" and "infelicity" for describing the "success" of a performative 
utterance, that is, whether it accomplished its aim. Austin called into question the referentiality of language, 
the stability of the relation between an author/rhetor and their text, and even whether truth and falsity are 
categories separable from his felicity and infelicity. 
39 Not that it ever did: Whiteness, class, and masculinity have always insulated some of us (Love). 
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damaged to make one" ("You are Triggering Me!").40 But notice how these student 
subjects move rhetorically from a state of defenseless sensitivity to reckless wielders of 
power, paralyzing others with overactive critique. Halberstam contends that the "politics 
of the aggrieved" have created a culture of "finger snapping moralism" in which the 
performance of outrage takes precedence over and displaces real activism ("You are 
Triggering Me!"). "[I]nstead of building alliances," sensitive students are blamed for 
"dismantling hard fought for coalitions," chilling the speech-climate so severely that 
hardly an event can be hosted or a conversation had—or a class taught—without 
offending someone's fragile sensitivity ("You are Triggering Me!").  
 Halberstam's portrait of the feminist and queer activist scene is perhaps the most 
toxic one yet painted in the debate over trigger warnings. I mean both that it's a portrait of 
a toxic scene, and a toxic representation. Here's what Halberstam says of the bad old days 
of sensitivity run amok during the "cultural feminism and lesbian separatism" of the 70s 
and 80s: 
Hardly an event would go by back then without someone feeling violated, hurt, 
traumatized by someone's poorly phrased question, another person's bad word 
choice or even just the hint of perfume in the room. People with various kinds of 
fatigue, easily activated allergies, poorly managed trauma were constantly holding 
up proceedings to shout in loud voices about how bad they felt because someone 
had said, smoked, or sprayed something near them that had fouled up their 
                                                
40 I confess it took me months to catch the Monty Python reference. Halberstam enfolds his critique of 
trigger warnings in a Monty Python motif, a performance of joking and taking lightly that is meant to 
exhort readers to laugh and do the same.  
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breathing room. Others made adjustments, curbed their use of deodorant, tried to 
avoid patriarchal language, thought before they spoke, held each other, cried, 
moped, and ultimately disintegrated into a messy, unappealing morass of weepy, 
hypo-allergic, psychosomatic, anti-sex, anti-fun, anti-porn, pro-drama, pro-
processing post-political subjects. ("You are Triggering Me!") 
It feels almost unfair to quote this passage without interruption, so flippant and insulting 
are its claims. Two scholarly articles on trigger warnings have quoted this same passage, 
also as a block quote, because perhaps we're unable to break up this monolith, unwilling 
to disrupt its affective impact, which widens and weighs heavier with the enumeration of 
what are insinuated to be frivolous complaints (anti-fun?). This passage is perhaps the 
peak of misunderstanding and minimizing the trauma trigger warnings are meant to 
acknowledge and respond to. 
 Many students do come to college with a privileged background that has insulated 
them from experiencing discrimination, violence, or poverty. But many do not. Following 
the protests at Yale and Mizzou, more than 35 student groups have issued lists of 
demands addressing systemic racism at their campuses (see http://www.thedemands.org/, 
or #BlackOnCampus on Twitter). Black students report on the damaging effects of 
insufficient campus mental health resources, insufficient staffing where cultural resource 
centers do exist, insufficient health care plans, insufficient financial aid counseling, and 
insufficient residential services during breaks; official titles, traditions, and monuments 
on campus that venerate slaveholders and erase Black labor; hanging nooses, drawn 
swastikas, marks on the portraits of Black professors. Black faculty too are 
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underrepresented, overutilized, sometimes assaulted by campus police and unsupported 
by the university. As more campuses consider institutional strategies to deal with the 
epidemic of sexual assault, some voice complaints about sensitive students availing 
themselves of legal protection under Title IX (Kipnis; 7 Humanities Professors). Queer 
students risk losing the support of their families and can lose their homes. Transgender 
students are not protected by non-discrimination laws in 31 states (Transgender Law 
Center). Almost 80% of students work while in school, many for long hours at low wages 
to pay their tuition (Fottrell). These are real issues, sometimes they constitute, cause, or 
stem from trauma. Prior or subsequent anxiety, depression, and or other mental health 
issues can undermine the perseverance required of even the most privileged students.41 
 Students have a lot at stake in their college classes. We may hope to get our 
students to focus less on their grade point average and more on learning, but we know 
that many scholarships are tied to grade point average. We may think students who are 
hurt by some part of our curricula are under no obligation to stay enrolled, but we know 
that student loans can enter repayment if students don't maintain required minimum hours 
of enrollment. Students are not simply free to extricate themselves from college courses, 
even those that become unpleasant, embarrassing, or traumatic. Attendance and grades 
are not only about the mastery of course material: They are in many cases about the 
stability of students' lives and livelihoods. Teachers do exercise a real authority with a 
material impact on our students.  
                                                
41 A 2015 student at Berkeley found that, of 790 graduate students surveyed, 47% met criteria for 
depression, with numbers at their highest among Ph.D. students in arts and humanities: 64% (Jaschik, "The 
Other Mental Health Crisis"; Panger, Tryon, and Smith). 
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 When teachers repudiate the sensitivity of students, insinuating that they ought to 
toughen up, these repudiations function as a defense of the right to inflict harm. When 
critics of trigger warnings express fear of being censored or of chilling the speech-
climate, they are objecting to the possibility that when what they say is construed as 
injurious, they will no longer be allowed to say it, and their freedom to criticize 
configured as central to academic freedom will be diminished. A right to inflict harm, in 
the form of critical and potentially injurious speech, is what they defend. An 
appropriately insensitive student would resist the hurt of injurious speech, submitting to 
their instructors' will to expose them to such speech but nevertheless resisting its ability 
to pierce. When critics of trigger warnings argue that the normal procedures of their 
classrooms would be disrupted if they had to warn their students about possible triggers, 
that argument makes it sound like the potential for trauma is so regularly inflicted on 
students that to advise them about it would halt the day-to-day activities of teaching. If 
we say that trigger warnings are disruptive of normal teaching, then the underlying 
premise is that such teaching is traumatic. There are a few critics of trigger warnings who 
have claimed that surprising students with difficult and even traumatic texts is a part of 
their pedagogical strategy. That pedagogy supposes that simply exposing students to 
difficult texts is enough to persuade them. It's on par with the pedagogy of the street 
preachers who travel from campus to campus throughout the year, shouting their 
messages of condemnation and redemption at passersby. The chances are no greater that 
surprising your students with graphic descriptions of the brutality of white supremacy, 
e.g., will make them into anti-racists than that your students will experience a religious 
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conversion because they overhear the street preacher's graphic description of hellfire. 
 Of course, students can't simply be insulated from the surprise of experiencing a 
trigger, which is to say that people who live with trauma cannot simply avoid or opt-out 
of its aftermath. Even the case of the street preacher illustrates a prior vulnerability to 
being addressed that one can't simply shut off or shut out. Before whatever potentially 
triggering speech will issue from the preacher's mouth, one is already vulnerable to being 
addressed. Perhaps like me you crank the volume on your headphones to drown him out: 
but even ignoring him—even a nonresponse—is already a response to the possibility of 
being addressed. Even before this stranger speaks, you are affected by the possibility of 
address, without which there would be nothing for you to willfully ignore. There is a kind 
of trauma in this possibility of being addressed, and teachers and their students are 
always implicated in precisely this rhetorical relation. It is a violence from which we 
cannot simply absolve ourselves. Perhaps we should be (more) anxious about the normal 
violence involved in exposing students to difficult and traumatic material—which is not 
to say we should not teach. Davis argues, following Levinas, that learning is "necessarily 
a trauma," that only in the failure of understanding and the inability to grasp do students 
(of all kinds) every undergo the rupture of knowledge that makes way for learning 
something different from what I already know, grasp, and understand (Inessential 
Solidarity 74). Trauma of this kind is disorienting: Davis calls it "a shattering of self and 
world" (74). It is impossible to skirt the ethical implication. A triggered student is 
stranded in this disorientation. Teaching is the possibility of beginning to respond, 
reorganize, and instantiate self and world differently. Surprise or exposure are not gone 
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from this scene of learning, but rearticulated as possibilities that are opened up by 
sensitivity, not shut down by it. 
 I want to circle back, briefly, to underscore that routinely traumatizing one's 
students with a pedagogy of shock is not what I am arguing is ethical. But that doesn't 
mean trauma is not, in other ways, routine. If learning is a space of trauma, it is a violent 
space, and that means it is also a space of ethicity. Teachers and students are more 
responsible, not less, because of the risks. Some critics of trigger warnings have argued 
that students must learn to manage their trauma (without requesting accommodations 
such as trigger warnings, it's implied), and that exposure therapy requires one to face 
their triggers to overcome them. This argument poses a contradiction, since of course 
exposure therapy is therapy, not college teaching: it is controlled, paced out, and 
protected by a therapeutic relationship, and therapy does not necessarily have a terminus, 
let alone a finals period. Therapy is not a teacher's responsibility, and many critics of 
trigger warnings seem troubled by the idea of designing accommodations for students 
with mental health issues, protesting that such students who need accommodations should 
be referred to student services and counseling centers (7 Humanities Professors).42 
Trigger warnings could be seen as a rich example of a community literacy practice 
through which students with disabilities design and advocate for their own 
accommodations (Simpkins and Orem). Such a view might even change how we 
                                                
42 In many cases, disabled students have good reasons not to seek a letter of accommodation from student 
services–such as when the accommodations made available by law are not actually helpful for the student–
or not to seek counseling at a university center–such as when timely appointments are not available, 
relevant professional expertise is not available, or when a student's confidentiality may be compromised by 
the university through a FERPA loophole, as was the case in 2015 at the University of Oregon (Pryal). 
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understand the student activism at UCSB that sought to require the use of trigger 
warnings by all professors on their syllabi. 
 We could understand the request, and even the requirement, of trigger warnings as 
a request for hospitality. Derrida argues that the foreigner who seeks a right of asylum is 
"first of all foreign to the legal language in which the duty of hospitality is formulated" 
(Of Hospitality 15), and so finds himself "ask[ing] for hospitality in a language which by 
definition is not his own, the one imposed on him by the master of the house, the host, the 
king, the lord, the authorities," (15) the teacher, the department chair, the dean. Students 
are foreigners to the university, and rhetoricians have long argued that students must be 
taught to speak its language (Bartholomae, "Inventing the University"). When students 
advocate for themselves as students, as in the case of trigger warnings, they still do so in 
translation, in the language of the university, that is, according to its norms and rules. 
When the UCSB student senate resolution aimed to require trigger warnings be used on 
every syllabus, student activists crafted a demand in the language they have been taught: 
that of the university's policies. There are doubtless some contingencies which helped to 
produce this resolution: that the author of the resolution is a sexual assault survivor who 
also serves in the student senate (Loverin). But if students turn first to a policymaking 
body (however non-binding) for redress instead of to their instructors and their 
classmates, perhaps they have hit a wall in the classroom which does not permit them to 
negotiate the norms by which class is conducted. Trigger warnings are one strategy that 
some students have adopted for making these norms explicit, negotiable, and consensual 
rather than tacit and reserved exclusively to the judgment of a teacher or institution. 
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Perhaps it is really threatening to instructors to imagine that our students could become 
participants in the design and delivery of their own education, but isn't this the goal of a 
critical pedagogy? Trigger warnings are a request students make in the only language 
they have been taught to not be so actively harmed by the institution they hope to be a 
part of.43 
 The specific point of using trigger warnings—to refrain from forcing others to 
relive or rehearse their experiences of trauma—is part of Derrida's illustration of 
hospitality. He cites this passage from Sophocles's Oedipus at Colonus, in which 
Oedipus, exiled, asks the chorus, "In the name of your hospitality (xenias), don't 
ruthlessly open up what I suffered" (qtd. in Derrida, Of Hospitality 41). This request 
doesn't protect Oedipus, but rather it exposes his vulnerability. A student request for 
trigger warnings exposes a similar vulnerability. It may expose that a particular student 
has undergone a particular trauma, and for this reason I believe that any policy on using 
trigger warnings should be negotiated together by a particular class of students. But a 
request for trigger warnings also exposes a solidarity in our mutual exposedness to 
trauma: we are all vulnerable to this affection. We are first of all sensitive to being 
addressed. How can one warn about what is by definition unanticipatable, unannounced, 
and unaccountable? Trigger warnings can be a way of welcoming students who are living 
with trauma, but they also welcome the trauma of being addressed: in the attempt to make 
it possible to confront triggering texts, they acknowledge the fact that language and 
                                                
43 Black student activism in the fall of 2015 reminds us that there are other ways to issue demands, sit-ins 
and walkouts among them, and that classroom norms are not the only aspects of college life students want 
to have a say in.  
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representation can and does touch us in traumatic ways. Trigger warnings are one way of 
acknowledging our inability to stop ourselves from suffering, from undergoing affection 
in language. This acknowledgement could be thought of as sensitizing, as making oneself 
sensitive to the destitution of others. This sensitivity welcomes within the trauma of the 
stranger or foreigner's need. It is not a way of coddling or insulating students from this 
affection, but precisely a way of opening it. Rather than being a way of shutting down 
and closing oneself off from wounding words, sensitivity opens one toward trauma, 
welcoming the affection of address. Teaching and learning depend on this sensitivity. 
Trigger warnings may sometimes help students prepare for trauma, for the rupture or 
(non)experience of being triggered. At the least, they offer teachers a way to signal that 
there might be rupture ahead.  
 
GENDERING SENSITIVITY 
 The repudiation of sensitivity in the debate over trigger warnings is a reaction 
against the trauma of exposedness. I want to make a case for understanding this reaction 
in gendered terms. Gender is an indispensable matrix of intelligibility for thinking about 
both what it means to be sensitive and what it means to experience or express sensitivity 
according to a particular style. Masculinity and femininity are shorthand that code for a 
shifting set of characteristics and styles. Sensitivity is gendered feminine. To be sensitive 
is not simply to be feminine, so the association of femininity and sensitivity in the trigger 
warning debate should prick our ears—it is a received part of our cultural understanding 
of gender. To undo this association would be to evacuate a part of what femininity 
  80 
means, i.e. what it signifies. The problem is that gender can't simply be separated from 
what it has been made to signify through fiat. Sensitivity does not tell us anything 
essential about women or femininity, but it does tell us something about the service that 
women, and femininity, are pressed into rhetorically, standing in for the exposedness that 
masculinism must repudiate in order to cohere ideologically as impenetrable and 
insensitive. 
 What is getting taken for evidence of students' sensitivity in the trigger warning 
debate has to do with exposure and receptivity. If we look closely at the knee-jerk 
reaction against sensitivity, at what it buys the rhetors who engage in it, and at the 
ideological commitments it entails pedagogically, I think it can open a window on the 
masculinism and misogyny that inflects our willingness to be exposed to one another in a 
rhetorical relation: in fact, to be sensitive. When critics of trigger warnings chide students 
for being too sensitive, they are rebuking what they see as an excessive emotionalism and 
attempting to constrain the authority of students to advocate for their own interests. In 
Feminism and Affect at the Scene of Argument, Barbara Tomlinson argues that 
associating femininity with excessive emotion is a rhetorical tactic deployed to curtail 
feminists' ethos. Tomlinson argues, "the ways we frame textuality, argument, authorship, 
politeness, and emotion emerge from and participate in gendered and racialized 
hierarchies," meaning that even the norms by which a conversation or debate is judged to 
be civil are coded masculine, as well as white (18). I'd add that gender and race are not 
the only hierarchies involved either. Tomlinson argues that the excessive emotionalism 
ascribed to "angry feminists" (hark, the racialized note of anger) constricts the rhetorical 
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authority feminists and feminist arguments can wield in a debate. Repudiating sensitivity 
can generate the appearance of a contrast between positions, making critics' seem rational 
and dispassionate and committed to elevated values over (against) feelings. By 
denigrating sensitivity, critics of trigger warnings imply that students shouldn't feel, or 
feel too much. 
 It is perhaps unsurprising to see this anti-feminist argument circulated by 
conservative opinion columnists like The LA Times's Jonah Goldberg ("The Peculiar 
Madness of Trigger Warnings"), or even by The Atlantic's Greg Lukianoff ("Trigger 
Warnings are Hurting Mental Health on Campus," with Jonathan Haidt), whose book 
Freedom From Speech is published by Roger Kimball's (Tenured Radicals) Encounter 
Press. But it is surprising, I think, to see feminist and queer scholars circulating similar 
claims, as several did in blog posts on Bully Bloggers, starting with Jack Halberstam's 
"You are Triggering Me! The Neoliberal Rhetoric of Harm, Danger and Trauma" in July 
2014. Halberstam is a professor of English and the Director of the Center for Feminist 
Research at the University of Southern California. Halberstam cofounded Bully Bloggers 
with Lisa Duggan, José Esteban Muñoz, and Tavia Nyong'o in 2009 and its deliberately 
provocative and frequently tongue-in-cheek style was in part a response to the 
conservative backlash of the Tea Party, and in part to conservative norms prevailing in 
gay and lesbian activism (for example, the Bully Bloggers "Freedom to Marry Our Pets 
Society Page" lampoons homonormativity in the gay marriage movement).  
 When Halberstam's post was published, the internet had been atwitter with alarm 
and outrage over trigger warnings in college classes for more than six months. I want to 
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take a moment here to draw attention to the affective force Halberstam's writing had on 
me and on others who might consider ourselves part of what Halberstam called "the 
triggered generation." It hurt. It was deflating, depressing, and disappointing. The 
depressing feeling made it difficult for me to find a way to write about trigger 
warnings—as if hurting made it harder to grasp and to respond, as if it were traumatic. In 
this way my experience of hurt and disappointment was not an experience at all, but 
rather a nonexperience in which emotion and affective force moved me but were 
nevertheless inappropriable to meaning-making. But the disappointment eventually 
became instructive: it provoked me to ask what hopes I thought were dashed in 
Halberstam's rejection of sensitivity, to explore the relationship I saw between feeling, 
feeling too much, and feminism, and to reflect on my own affective response as itself 
evidence of my own exposedness to the injuriousness of language. Language wounds and 
opens us all, and in this way we are all all too sensitive. While I make no claims about the 
capacity of my own experience reading Halberstam's post to represent the experiences of 
others, it was my own sensitivity that allowed me to feel Halberstam's defense of 
injurious speech as itself injurious. Because the tone of the piece is so flippant, and the 
argument so organized around the tonic power of humor, the feeling of being wounded 
can seem like an anticipated or even invited affective response. It is doubtless the central 
(non)experience that organizes what's at stake in the debate over trigger warnings. 
 The remainder of this section focuses on Halberstam's post and on one 
particularly barbed response to it in part because Halberstam has already made the case 
for precisely the kind of interjection in the academy from outside it that trigger warnings 
  83 
represent. In The Queer Art of Failure, Halberstam argues for "low theory," a subversive 
form of intellectualism that "seeks not to explain but to involve" (15). Low theory would 
seem to call for us to privilege the involvement of marginalized and underrepresented 
students as not just fully equal but crucial participants in higher education. So what has 
made the repudiation of sensitivity so appealing as to override prior ethical, political, and 
intellectual commitments of feminist scholars? I contend that critiquing sensitivity 
appears on its face to be a neutral critique of a nongendered quality, but that it actually 
conceals a complex set of switchbacks in the distribution of gendered norms that govern 
the relative values of sensitivity and whatever its opposites may be (i.e. toughness, 
hardness, resilience, and so on).  
 It is difficult to be specific in tracing out cultural beliefs about gender. Even 
hegemonic beliefs are not universally shared. Still they are at once so deeply and 
thoroughly sedimented that they seem obviously, trivially true—and yet to excavate them 
and state them plainly makes them sound totally indefensible. In the conversation about 
trigger warnings in college classes, sensitivity is aligned with the passive, timid, 
receptive, weepy, overly emotional, and hyper allergic as feminine. The grouping 
together of these characteristics under the heading of femininity works to enable a certain 
masculinism in the critique of trigger warnings: that is, a certainty about one's critique, 
about the coherence and impenetrability of one's position. Masculinity is engendered by 
the disavowal of all the things it purports not to be, which are ascribed to femininity, 
making femininity into a holding tank for everything not sufficiently masculine. But this 
feminine work of holding masculinity together also betrays and undoes the self-
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sufficiency, coherence, and constancy that make masculinity up. Without a secondarized 
femininity to oppose itself to, masculinity appears as extremely fragile. Masculinity is 
vulnerable to comprise or contamination by basically anything: the Twitter hashtag 
#MasculinitySoFragile, which trended in 2015, inventoried vigorously gendered 
marketing campaigns, from "camouflage" scented candles to q-tips, sunscreen, and dryer 
sheets for men (see Banet-Weiser and Miltner). Masculinity must constantly police its 
borders, hyper allergic to everything exterior to it, in need of shielding, energetically 
disavowing and excluding its own fragility by ascribing it to femininity instead. Anything 
insufficiently insulated from the affection of the outside must be thrown out. On this view 
masculinity amounts to nothing other than a series of exclusions, nothing other than the 
negation of femininity, the secondarization of a term posited to en-gender a dichotomy 
we wouldn't hesitate to call "false" if it weren't so extremely powerful. And yet, so 
vulnerable it requires protection at all costs. Masculinity retains its shape and its position 
of dominance by excluding everything it wants not to be. This exclusion is frenetic and 
wide-ranging, it trips on a hair trigger, and it has to be in order to stabilize the appearance 
of binary gender. We have known this for at least decades—Halberstam was a major 
contribution to the project of this exposition—but binary gender is an ideological illusion 
that requires maintenance, and will not disappear from hegemony, let alone effectivity, 
simply by being unmasked according to a hermeneutics of suspicion. It hasn't yet.  
 Take for example Halberstam's call on Bully Bloggers for sensitive students to 
learn how to take a joke. The emphasis on having a sense of humor and taking things 
lightly configures humor as a kind of inoculation against the violence or harm of trauma. 
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The blog post opens by acknowledging that "humor is something feminists in particular, 
but radical politics in general, are accused of lacking," but it then recirculates this trope of 
the humorless feminist, or feminist killjoy, as a way of minimizing trauma as trumped up 
("You are Triggering Me!"). Simultaneously arguing that queer youth groups have 
propagated the investment of millennials in safe spaces, and that these millennials face no 
real threats that they would need to be shielded from, Halberstam calls for a hardening 
instead, a laughter that would deflect whatever piercing or wounding could possibly take 
place in only words. 
 And someone did answer Halberstam's call, with a piercing joke of their own: a 
parody Twitter account named Jock Halberslam (@halberslam). @halberslam's first 
tweet was posted the day after Halberstam's Bully Bloggers post on trigger warnings was 
published. The profile picture for the account is an author photo of Halberstam that's been 
modified with (apparently) MS Paint, to add black sunglasses and a red backwards ball 
cap, which is emblazoned "WALL-E," a reference to Halberstam's writing about Pixar 
films in his 2011 The Queer Art of Failure. It should be obvious enough from the name 
that Jock Halberslam's main target is this certain masculinism, and the valorization of 
thick skin. Perhaps my favorite example of @halberslam's skewering of masculinism is 
the following tweet: "don't ever warn me about anything. people say jock ur about to fall 
into that manhole and i'm like what are you, a baby? i can take it." And apparently 
Halberstam can take it: @halberslam is cited/embraced in a follow-up post on Bully 
Bloggers, "Triggering Me/Triggering You: Making Up Is Hard To Do" (posted July 15, 
2014). A lot of the @halberslam tweets are really funny, and/but a lot of them are quite 
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cutting, and many (in my opinion) exaggerate whatever reinvestment in or glorification 
of masculinity can be traced to Halberstam's work.44 Halberstam may have felt some 
sense of obligation to live his creed and laugh off the wounding that attends the joke. I 
can't know. But this "laughing off," this gesture of embracing the cutting joke could also 
be read as a doubling down on Halberstam's imperviousness to being wounded.  
 A reading of the embrace as deflective opens an inquiry into what the cutting of 
@halberslam has to teach us. In the first place, the jokes are funny because they are 
cutting. And that cutting not only answers the charge of humorlessness with humor, but it 
also exposes the exposedness of the critic to that cut. The aggressivity of the parody 
account could be read (am I overreading here? ...reading that which is not over?) as 
evidence of a similar affective response on the part of the parodist(s) to the response that 
I had: disappointment, and damage, but especially anger. The cutting joke may be 
intended as just a joke, but it is also clearly an attempt to wound,45 pointed at making the 
point that we are all exposed; if Bully Bloggers can hurt its readers and say it's just 
joking, a Twitter account can hurt the bully back. If it couldn't hurt, didn't cut, then 
there'd be no need for Halberstam to deflect the hurt it by embracing it, by laughing it off. 
If the joke didn't pierce, there would be no need to demonstrate one's imperviousness to 
                                                
44 Whether a post on Bully Bloggers would be defended as part of a scholar's "work" is a question worth 
raising; one assumes a blog post is several revisions away from scholarly writing that has been subjected to 
peer review. At the same time, Bully Bloggers has often served not only as a site for provoking and 
instigating debate, but for developing lines of argument into panel discussions and conference papers, or for 
posting remarks delivered in another venue. 
45 Even, to wound back: to retaliate for one's own feeling wounded. The parodist feels hurt by 
Halberstam's hurtful critique of feeling hurt, and responds by trying to wound Halberstam. Halberstam's 
critique is that hurt feelings, taken too seriously, might be used to hurt others, but he argues that critique in 
a way that hurts others for feeling hurt. 
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puncture. The disavowal of sensitivity is what makes the joke sting. It is aimed at 
wounding: you hurt me for hurting, so hurting you back will show you that you can hurt, 
too. 
 In the paragraph that opens José Muñoz's Cruising Utopia, he writes, "Queerness 
is a thing that lets us feel that this world is not enough, that indeed something is missing" 
(1). Queerness is a thing that lets us feel. Oblique to and defiant of the gendered norms 
that govern and discipline feeling, queerness opens a channel through which we are 
affected by exteriority. This opening both structures and destructures rhetorical agents, at 
once making it possible to be sensitive to the address or affection of another, and at the 
same time making it impossible to simply grasp, experience, or apprehend this affection. 
In the debate over trigger warnings, sensitivity has been made to signify an excessive 
vulnerability and neediness, and to locate these features in others (students) in order to 
disavow it everywhere else. But even this posturing of impenetrability nevertheless 
exposes a fragility, vulnerability, or sensitivity which underwrites it. What use is the 
fiction that one doesn't feel? Or that one's feelings are always appropriate, restrained, and 
subjected to one's faculty of reason? Repudiating sensitivity works to absolve the critic of 
the violence of address, as if one could simply opt out of the ethical questions opened by 
teaching when learning always call for trauma. But through its disavowal, sensitivity has 
become the center of public discussion about harm and responsibility in the scene of the 
college campus. And from that position sensitivity has continued to signify excessively, 
calling for attention as a thing that lets us feel, a rhetorical relation that obtains despite 
every attempt to stop feeling and close that sensitivity off.  
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Chapter 3: Twisted Together: Twine Games and Solidarity 
 
Write to be read. 
— Porpentine, "Creation Under Capitalism and the Twine Revolution" 
 
I can only understand things in terms of what I am. What a dumb racket 
— Mountain 
 
 In 2014, artist and animator David OReilly released a video game called 
Mountain. OReilly had earned some notoriety for animating the fictional game Alien 
Child played by Joaquin Phoenix's character in the Spike Jonze film Her (2013). Hailed 
as OReilly's "first real video game," Mountain also contested many of the features people 
have come to expect of video games: although you can change your perspective, zooming 
in on the leeward side or out into space, or changing the angle of view, the controls for 
Mountain simply say: "NOTHING." Playing Mountain means watching time pass, 
seasons and weather change, as goofy and sometimes strange foreign objects collide with 
(or zip uneventfully by) the mountain: a bowling pin, an orange traffic cone, a giant 
banana. From time to time, a musical ping sounds and text that seems both randomly 
generated and poignant appears in the game's screen, as if you are the sole audience 
member for the mountain's inner thoughts. (This chapter's epigraph is drawn from my 
own playthrough of Mountain.) If you're not quick to capture these brief apparitions of 
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text, they'll be forever lost. Occasionally, a sunlike source of light seems to dawn and a 
single-note chorus seems to greet the day. 
 
Fig. 1. Mountain, embedded with cake, crate, trash can, and other objects. 
 
  90 
 Mountain certainly contests the commonplace criteria usually used to identify a 
video game: there seems to be no quests or puzzles, no hero, no win condition. OReilly 
commented on his expansive view of what constitutes a video game when he told online 
tech magazine The Verge, 
Everything is also a game, including this sentence, where I can make your eye 
move left to right, and make sense of these abstract shapes we've agreed upon. 
You're rendering these shapes into thought on my behalf, it only feels like you're 
in control, and you are for the most part, but I'm guiding you, and I want you to 
keep going, even though you can quit at any time (Webster). 
Mountain received a good deal of press after its release. It was accessible to purchase; it 
cost one dollar. And even though Mountain was a brazen incursion into the territory 
occupied by an insular and contentious community of gamers, made by a virtual outsider, 
as far as I can tell nobody sent OReilly a barrage of physically threatening and sexually 
violent messages, or posted his personal contact information online publicly, or called the 
police with a fake crisis situation in order to get a SWAT team dispatched to his home 
address. But all these things have happened to women video game developers, with more 
frequency and a higher profile in the two years since the culture war known as 
GamerGate was touched off by the success of a text-based game called Depression 
Quest, which was built with an open-source software tool called Twine.46 Twine games 
                                                
46 Video games and interactive fiction (IF) actually have a shared history, which many trace back to the 
1976 computer game Colossal Cave Adventure. Some argue that Twine is a return to the text-based roots of 
video game history (see Zhu). Colossal Cave Adventure, like many IF or text-based games, relies on parser 
for the player to interact with the game. To be effective, your input has to exactly match the language and 
syntax of the computer program. The Twine author Porpentine has written a critique of the exclusionary 
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are exported as HTML files, so many of them are published as websites, but they can also 
be made available for download and played offline. Like Mountain, Depression Quest 
contests commonplaces about what constitutes a video game. 
 When you launch Depression Quest on a computer, which you can do through the 
popular digital game distribution software called Steam, you are greeted by a description 
of depression penned by the late David Foster Wallace overlaid on a background that 
looks like a staticky tv screen. A lengthy description of the game contextualizes the goals 
of the game: to simulate depression, so that "other sufferers will come to know that they 
aren't alone," and to make people without depression aware of what living with 
depression actually feels like.  
                                                                                                                                            
function of parser in her essay "Creation Under Capitalism and the Twine Revolution," exemplified, I 
think, by this succinct parser failure: "> hug is not recognized" (Porpentine). 
  92 
 
Fig. 2. The opening screen from Depression Quest. 
 
When a player begins the game, the player is addressed in the second person—"You are a 
mid-twenties human being"—in a way that invites you to identify with the protagonist of 
the game. Characteristic of a game made with Twine, the text that appears on screen is 
laden with hyperlinks that connect to other nodes in the game (these nodes are called 
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"passages" in Twine). At crucial junctures, Depression Quest presents you with choices 
to make about what to do and how to care for yourself, but in order to simulate the 
limitations of living with depression, some of these options expire—instead of appearing 
as a bold purple hyperlink, the text appears in red with a strike through. The game 
assesses your choices, and tracks the state of your depression, which eliminates more 
possible choices as your depression deepens. 
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Fig. 3. Your limited and diminishing choices in Depression Quest. 
 
Depression Quest uses what video game scholar Ian Bogost has called "procedural 
rhetoric" to make its argument. In Persuasive Games, Bogost writes, "Procedural rhetoric 
is a technique for making arguments with computational systems and for unpacking 
computational arguments others have created" (3). The "rules" of the game constrain, 
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enable, and in this case purposefully diminish the agency of the player. The game's 
argument is made by way of its rules. In Anna Anthropy's 2012 manifesto on do-it-
yourself digital games credited with popularizing Twine, Rise of the Videogame 
Zinesters: How Freaks, Normals, Amateurs, Artists, Dreamers, Dropouts, Queers, and 
People Like You Are Taking Back an Art Form, Anthropy argues that "[s]ince games are 
composed of rules, they're uniquely suited to exploring systems and dynamics" and 
"especially good at communicating relationships" between "actions or choices and their 
consequences" (20). 
 Depression Quest was made by game developer Zoe Quinn, and when the game 
garnered awards and accolades, its growing prestige ignited an anti-feminist and  
misogynist backlash against women, feminists, and cultural critics in the video games 
world. Dubbed GamerGate, the so-called movement purported to be about "ethics in 
video games journalism" (a flimsy pretext that derives from the embittered ranting of 
Quinn's ex-boyfriend), but in reality, GamerGate is defined by the sustained harassment 
(both online and off) and threats of violence against women and any remotely cultural 
critic of video games.47 Feminist games critic Anita Sarkeesian, who was scheduled to 
give a talk at Utah State University in October 2014, was forced to cancel when the 
university, bound by the state's campus carry law, could not forbid attendees from 
bringing guns to the lecture, even in the face of an explicitly threatened school shooting if 
                                                
47 For more thorough treatments of GamerGate's specious claims, anti-feminist and misogynist context, 
and the historical patterns of harassment and abuse within gamer culture, see Mantilla; Massanari; Chess & 
Shaw; Heron; and Mortensen. 
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Sarkeesian's talk went on as planned.48 Although GamerGate was not an unprecedented 
upwelling of misogynist harassment (Sarkeesian and other prominent women in the video 
games industry, including Felicia Day and Brianna Wu, had been targeted with threats 
and harassment since 2012; see Tomkinson & Harper), it does represent an intensification 
that some have argued bespeaks the growing power and visibility, within gamer culture, 
of historically underrepresented people (Todd). Sarah Beth Evans and Elyse Janish argue 
in "#INeedDiverseGames: How the Queer Backlash to GamerGate Enables Nonbinary 
Coalition" that "[f]eminists became the scapegoats of GamerGate" because they 
"represent[ed] the larger trends of growing diversity and queerness in gaming that can no 
longer be denied or ignored" (127). 
 A major force in this trending toward diversity and queerness is an open-source 
software called Twine. Developed in 2009 by Chris Klimas, Twine enables its users to 
design games without requiring much knowledge of programming languages or computer 
code. Users of Twine can create a game by making hyperlinks that connect passages or 
nodes. Twine can be complexified using computer protocols like HTML, CSS, and 
Javascript, but its simplicity means that virtually anyone can use it to make a game, even 
those who don't have the access to the resources or coding knowledge possessed by 
industry insiders. In an essay called "Love, Twine, and the End of the World," game 
designer Anna Anthropy argues, "All you need to know to make a game in Twine is how 
to write. And the same way that people who don't think of themselves as artists know 
                                                
48 The contradictory positions gamers took up in relation to public debates about gun violence and its 
representation in video games was succinctly articulated in this tweet by @TheSquink: "1999: gamers 
demand we stop blaming school shootings on videogames. 2014: gamers threaten a school shooting 
because videogames" (Squinky). 
  97 
how to doodle on napkins, folks who don't think of themselves as writers know how to 
scrawl in a journal" (36). Using Twine can make video game design more personal, 
ephemeral, and accessible than ever before. You don't have to be affiliated with a 
corporate studio to make a Twine game. You don't even have to be familiar with how to 
write computer code.  
 In this chapter, I am going to give examples of some of what's possible in Twine 
that doesn't have much precedent in traditional video games. I argue that these games are 
each rhetorically inventive in the sense that they expand the available means of 
persuasion. Video games always make arguments, however implicitly. Twine, billed by 
The New York Times Magazine in 2014 as the "video game technology for all," opens this 
rhetorical space to voices that have previously been marginalized or altogether silenced 
(Hudson). Twine has empowered a cohort of game designers—many of whom are 
underrepresented in and by mainstream games—to design and disseminate games that 
critique or altogether abandon the violent, corporate, masculinist, and even humanist 
values of predominant gamer culture. Twine games contest the highly policed definition 
of video games, and as the reactionary backlash to Depression Quest demonstrated, the 
values articulated with these definitions are passionately held but also deeply gendered. 
 
TWINE'S PROCEDURAL RHETORICS 
 I want to take a moment to reflect on the second-person address that I'm adopting 
in this chapter. Though its informality is not usually preferred in scholarly writing, 
addressing you, my readers, as "you" serves an important rhetorical function here. It 
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places my authorial voice somewhere in the same neighborhood as the second-person 
address adopted by the developers of many text-based digital games, and it aligns me to 
some extent with David OReilly's claim that even this sentence is a game: governed by 
certain normative and/or interpretive rules, temporally precarious should you be 
interrupted or decide to quit, and most importantly for my purposes, relational. If you will 
accept, even provisionally, that reading can be a game, then a related (underlying) 
premise is that rhetoric, or addressed language, can be a game, and it depends 
fundamentally on your ability to be affected in and by language. So a question is: can 
language be a video game? And what if language is a video game? And as you are 
reading this chapter, I ask that you take time, if you have it, to play at least a few of the 
games I'll discuss—it will give you a very different experience than only reading about 
them, or in addition to reading about them. Throughout this chapter, I've included 
screenshots where I think having a visual of the thing I'm describing is most helpful. 
 Like the video games that are made with Twine, Twine itself is a rule-governed 
digital program, and it too has a procedural rhetoric delimited by the operations it can 
perform. In an essay on video games and sexuality called "Ludus Interruptus," Twine 
author Merritt Kopas argues that video games have tended since their inception to be 
about conflict, competition, overcoming resistance and obstacles, and solving problems 
or puzzles (Kopas). These tendencies make it difficult, she argues, to develop games that 
incorporate sexuality without making sex into another conflict or challenge. Answering 
the claim that it's just technologically easier to develop ballistic mechanics rather than 
responsive dialogue, or to show bodies ripped apart and dying rather than embracing, 
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Kopas reminds us that even if this claim were true, "development technologies aren't 
neutral; they're informed by the interests of their creators, often in subtle and totally 
unpredictable ways" (223). In other words, the procedural rhetoric of mainstream studio 
games has been shaped over time to privilege violence—and it could, in theory, be 
reshaped in other directions. In "The Machine That Therefore I Am," Jim Brown reminds 
us, "rules are not only followed. They are also authored" (497). By looking at the 
procedural rhetoric of Twine games made by outsiders to that mainstream studio game 
world, we can explore what new procedural rhetorics have been made possible by Twine, 
and by its ability to open the writing of procedures to "all," as The New York Times 
Magazine claimed. 
 Jane Friedhoff's platform study of Twine, published in the 2013 proceedings of 
the Digital Games Research Association, takes a closer look at what about Twine's 
software design makes it such a fruitful tool for queer authors/game makers, for people 
without much experience coding, and for creating games that deal with "taboo" topics 
and traumas that would never see the light of day on Xbox Live or in the Apple's App 
Store (Friedhoff). Friedhoff argues that Twine's reference materials focus not on the 
technical aspects of making games with the tool, but first on "answering 'why would you 
make a game at all?'" (3). Twine's documentation is oriented toward what Friedhoff calls 
"the expressive potential" of using hypertext's interactivity. Twine also has unofficial 
documentation, including tutorials by Anna Anthropy and Porpentine, which 
contextualize Twine's capabilities in political and artistic terms. As Friedhoff contends, 
"These tutorials act as a call-to-arms for potential developers, validating and encouraging 
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the use of individual experience as the subject of a game" (3). The validity of writing 
about your individual experience is also a key part of Twine's accessibility: Friedhoff 
argues that Twine lends itself well to writing in the genre of the vignette, which she 
defines, citing Ian Bogost, as a "brief, indefinite, evocative description or account of a 
person or situation" (6). Although nothing in Twine's design restricts it to proceeding 
mainly by text rather than say, images, or even sounds, Friedhoff points out that the 
visual, spatial layout of Twine's passages resembles writers' planning and organizing 
technologies, from notecards to Scrivener. But the connections between passages in 
Twine also resembles an organic structure: Porpentine compares Twine games to 
"creatures under a microscope or root networks carrying information" (qtd. in Friedhoff, 
4). Porpentine even runs a Tumblr account that posts pictures of Twine "node maps," 
fittingly called "Twine Garden" (http://twinegarden.tumblr.com/).  
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Fig. 4. Node map of the Twine game At This Very Moment in This Work Here I Am. 
 
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, Friedhoff points out the "Twine's distribution 
model is key to its support of non-mainstream games" (7) While developing a game for 
iPhone or Xboxes may require payment for a development kit, permission to release work 
in the format and/or to sell work released in the format, and even the scrutiny of a review 
process that may explicitly bar some kinds of content, Twine has none of these barriers. It 
can be used for free on Mac or Windows operating systems. Twine games can be 
exported directly to HTML files that can be uploaded to your own site or to a free Twine 
hosting site like philome.la (http://philome.la) or even emailed directly to players. There 
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is no customs authority reviewing your game's content. Twine's openness and flexibility 
have earned it the reputation of "the video game technology for all." 
 
INTIMACY, EPHEMERALITY, AND APOCALYPSE 
 So what kinds of games are we talking about? Kopas also argues in the same 
essay that "tools like Twine that are making it possible for new kinds of authors to make 
games about forms of sex and kinds of relationships that are totally underrepresented" 
(232). Here's one example from Kopas's own body of work: Consensual Torture 
Simulator. In Consensual Torture Simulator, you have agreed to an SM scene with your 
girlfriend in which you will use impact play (slapping, spanking, flogging, hitting) to 
make your partner cry. 
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Fig. 5. A decision point in Consensual Torture Simulator. 
 
Getting her to cry is the goal of the scene, but it is not necessarily the goal of the game: 
you can stop the scene at any time, and your decisions can escalate or de-escalate the 
scene's intensity. When I played Consensual Torture Simulator, I had already read a lot 
about it, so I thought I knew what would happen in the game, and I thought I had a sense 
of the argument it could make. I suppose I thought I was emotionally prepared to play it, 
but I was surprised by my own resistance to escalation. I found that I had to exceed the 
level of sustained impact I was comfortable with in order to make my partner cry. 
Moreover, her tears come in varying intensities—"crying" isn't a simple or obvious win 
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condition—so I felt it was up to me to decide when and if we had met our goal. In the 
denouement of the game, you administer aftercare to your partner, praising and 
comforting her and getting her a glass of water or fixing her a cup of tea. It's remarkable 
how much responsibility you feel, how you confront your own normative beliefs about 
sexuality, violence, partnership, negotiation, consent, and care in just the few minutes it 
takes to play the game.  
 So one thing you can do in a Twine game that you can't do in a traditional video 
game is negotiate sex and consent as physical and emotional activities instead of just 
conquest. In the blockbuster game of 2015, Fallout 4, for example, sex is essentially the 
result of stat check. During dialogue with a potential partner, the option to "flirt" appears. 
There's no description of what strategies you might use to flirt; no multiple ways to 
approach flirting as a task. If you choose to flirt, the game checks your character's 
charisma stat. This is basically a pick up artist's idea of the interplay between sex and 
procedural rhetoric: seduction is a performance that deserves to be rewarded, and sex is 
the reward. Consensual Torture Simulator disperses this transactional view of sex with a 
scene of trust, risk, decision, and care. Rather than procedures that orient your partner as 
a target, Consensual Torture Simulator's procedures affect you, making you feel the 
limits of your character's agency and, perhaps, your own. 
 Twine can also create ephemeral experiences. As studio games get exponentially 
bigger, featuring huge traversable worlds, 50-hour main quests and dozens of repeatable 
side quests, games like Lydia Neon's Player 2 or Anna Anthropy's Queers in Love at the 
End of the World stand out in sharp contrast. Player 2 is a reconciliation game, and it was 
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the first Twine game I ever played. The game opens by announcing that your playthrough 
will be kept safely anonymous, and it even explains how you can download the game and 
play offline if you so prefer. "Player 2" isn't a party to the game, not directly, but 
someone you choose to fill the role, someone who has hurt or wronged you. The game 
puts you in control of how you represent and respond to them.  
 
Fig. 6. You control the situation in Player 2. 
 
Player 2 is about forgiveness, or letting go of negative feelings and moving on from an 
interpersonal conflict that's weighing you down. When the game is over, nothing you've 
done has been saved. In Queers in Love at the End of the World, like Player 2, nothing is 
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saved: a timer counts down ten seconds before the apocalypse wipes everything away. 
According to the author, there are 180 unique nodes in the game—far more than even the 
speediest reader could navigate in the allotted time. When the game ends, an option to 
"Restart" appears—I find myself replaying this game five or six times in a row every 
time I play it.  
 
Fig. 7. Time is running out in Queers in Love at the End of the World. 
 
Each playthrough offers you a tiny slice of a vast and varied world. A brief moment of 
possibility opens right before, and because, "Everything is wiped away." Queers in Love 
at the End of the World lets you explore that possibility. The sense of magnitude is 
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humbling for me, especially against the apocalyptic backdrop: you'll only see as much of 
this world as you can in the limited time you have left. Even when a path ends before the 
timer runs out, you can never exhaust all the possibilities in one run. 49 And yet, even in 
the face of total annihilation, you're always offered the chance to "restart." Queers in 
Love at the End of the World is a testimony about the force of even ephemeral love to 
outlast—to outlast both the norms and laws that have prohibited it, and the shared world 
that made it possible. The procedurality of the ticking clock has a rhetorical force of 
engendering panic, but the consistency with which the world is destroyed can also allay 
your sense of urgency. 
 
VIDEO GAMES AND RHETORICAL IDENTIFICATION 
 In just these few examples, you can get a sense of the range of what's possible in 
Twine: games that deal frankly with subjects like sex, trauma, and loss that engage their 
players through a close description of experience. These games frequently invite their 
players, or incline them, to identify with the protagonist by addressing the player as the 
protagonist in the second person. Players are positioned to make decisions for/as the main 
character, even when their choices are limited, illusory, or simply bad. The player takes 
responsibility for, or takes the place of, the game's character. In an article for Bitch Media 
about Twine games and the emerging "gender horror" genre, Carli Velocci puts it this 
                                                
49 My colleague Steven LeMieux points out that some e-poetry projects have engendered a similar 
endlessness, including, for example, computer-generated poems so long that the time it would take to read 
them is longer than the time left before the heat-death of the universe. One way of reading all the possible 
text, he suggests, is by looking at the web site's source code. Of course, that's a somewhat technical and 
highly trained way of reading, radically different than what Twine anticipates its readers will want to (or 
are able to) do. 
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way: "As a system that, at its core, is about interactivity and sympathy, games can 
experiment with the idea of the narrator in a way that other mediums can't. While the 
printed word can place you into the first-person view of a character, there often remains a 
distance in that you don't have to fully inhabit them. In these horror Twines, the world 
created by the game developer traps a player in a gruesome experience" (Velocci). This 
aspect of video games, which rhetoricians might be tempted to label "identification" in 
familiar terms, is hotly contested in video games scholarship and in online gaming 
communities. 
 Games scholars, have approached identification a bit differently than most 
rhetoricians. Gee argues in What Video Games Have to Teach Us About Learning and 
Literacy that identification with characters in a game happens as a projection of your own 
identity into the identity of a character. In what Gee dubs a "tripartite play of identities," 
the virtual identity of the character is tied to the real-world identity of the player through 
a "projective identity" (58-66). In Gee's view, projective identity is the place where your 
pre-existing values and ways of being in the world can be challenged and revised, since 
projective identity is where your beliefs come into contact with the values and capacities 
of your character. Media studies scholar Jonathan Cohen has developed a set of criteria 
that others have used to assess identification with video game characters (Cohen; Shaw), 
but his definition of identification as the internalizing of another's perspective and 
explicitly not "a process of projecting one's own identity onto someone or something 
else" sets him in conflict with Gee's approach. For Gee, identification is a complex scene 
that can, given the right conditions, enable learning. For Cohen, identification is more 
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limited, but his view still privileges what he calls "vicarious experience" (249)—the 
chance to see things according to someone else's perspective. To some extent, these 
views of identification comport with rhetorical views of learning through identification 
advanced by exercises in character, such as ethopoeia and prosopopoeia (See Hagaman; 
Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric). But another widely held view of rhetorical identification is 
drawn from the work of Kenneth Burke.  
 In his influential Rhetoric of Motives, Burke argues that identification is the better 
part of what rhetoricians call persuasion. Rhetoric, which Burke defines as addressed 
language, always implies an audience (38), and so rhetoric is always relational (even if 
your audience is yourself). At times Burke seems to hold the position that persuasion is 
not complete without or until the rhetor and audience successfully establish 
identification; at other times, it seems he holds identification to be a precondition for 
persuasion: "Only those voices from without are effective which can speak in the 
language of a voice from within" (39). But what's clear about Burke's theory of 
identification is that it is "compensatory to division" (22)—identification is a way of 
crossing a chasm that contains and separates individuals from one another. For Burke, the 
independence of the individual is axiomatic, a biological given. This independence has, 
of course, been called into question by not only rhetorical theorists, but also by scholars 
working in ecology, human neuroscience, animal biology, and more. And, arguably, it is 
called into question by Burke's own theory that language has the power to move 
individuals to take action through symbolic means alone. While Burke's view of 
identification is widely circulated (a Google Scholar search for "identification" in texts 
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citing Rhetoric of Motives shows more than 2900 hits), rhetoricians have extended this 
work (Ratcliffe 2005) and offered it significant challenges (Davis 2010). In "The 
Machine That Therefore I Am," Jim Brown writes, "Kenneth Burke's work on 
identification can be understood as one long line of attempts to deal with withdrawal, 
with how rhetoric is an attempt to narrow the gap between humans, to show how 'I' am 
like 'you'" (507). 
 
 
IDENTIFICATION AND/AS VIOLENCE 
  Even though identification is understood to unite audience and rhetor, or player 
and character, identification can also serve an exclusionary and even boundary-policing 
function. GamerGate is a heated example of this policing, and of its self-reinforcing 
nature. Evans and Janish argue that a gendered binary which align "real gamers" with 
hypermasculinity and fake gamers with femininity and feminism structured GamerGaters' 
arguments about the controversy. Evans and Janish point out that this doubling down on 
the toxicity of gamer identity further drives out people who play games but don't wish to 
associate themselves with the attributes of "real gamers." They write: "The rejection and 
harassment of nonnormative players embedded in games culture undoubtedly influences 
the many players who do not claim 'gamer' as an identifier because they do not identify 
with the prevailing values and practices associated with 'gamers.'" Of course, such 
hyperallergic policing of ingroup identity effectively produces a fallacious "no true 
Scotsman" fallacy: even someone who lived and breathed video games could have their 
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credibility to offer critiques assassinated, since no true gamer would offer such critiques 
to begin with. Or in Zoe Quinn's case, no true gamer would make a video game worthy of 
press and accolades if that game dared to differ from the hypermasculine norms of true 
games.50 
 It may seem like identification in gaming culture requires strict adherence to harsh 
and narrowly defined norms. But compare the fate of Quinn's Depression Quest to that of 
OReilly's Mountain. It's not like you're any more a mountain than you are a trans lesbian 
space bandit (probably), as in Anna Anthropy's And the Robot Horse You Rode In On, 
and for most people Quinn's depressed person is probably a much more relatable 
character. But men are allowed much more leeway with the norms than women; or more 
precisely, people who deviate from more than one cultural norm are exposed to more 
intense scrutiny than are others more proximate to the center. But so Mountain itself has a 
commentary to offer on the policing function of identification, and its insight heads this 
chapter as the epigraph: "I can only understand things in terms of what I am. What a 
dumb racket" (Mountain).  
                                                
50 One may wonder why games like Animal Crossing or Harvest Moon did not attract this intensity of 
backlash, perhaps because they had the protection of a major corporate brand (Nintendo).  
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Fig. 8. A poignant, computer-generated thought from Mountain. 
 
Mountain's evaluation of the limits of understanding crystalizes an argument in 
circulation about rhetoric and identification: the only thing that can be grasped, mastered, 
and assimilated to understanding is the same thing, something that is in fact already 
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understood. This argument has been made by philosophers such as Martin Heidegger, 
although it is perhaps much more centrally articulated in the work of Emmanuel Levinas. 
For Levinas, the alterity of the other is so tremendous that identification can never 
overcome it: it can only diminish it. Identification that erases the alterity of the other is 
violence. 
 The violence of identification is put under the microscope in the first chapter of 
Diane Davis's Inessential Solidarity: Rhetoric and Foreigner Relations. Davis puts 
Burke's theory of identification back into conversation with one of Burke's major 
influences: Sigmund Freud. What Davis calls Burke's "quiet rivalry with Freud" is 
located in the question of whether identification is conscious and symbolic, as Burke 
came to contend, or unconscious and unavailable to rational critique, as in Freud. 
Carefully tracing the consequences of Burke's position, Davis argues that if identification 
was first of all symbolic, if it does depend on shared meaning, then the subject (who 
identifies) must already know itself as and through symbolic representation—the self-
knowledge of the subject must be mediated. This sticks Burke with a bit of a 
contradiction. Davis: "Burke describes identity as an effect of the processes of 
identification and identification as the achievement of an already discernable (biological) 
'identity'" (22). It takes some digging into Freud's perspective to see what Burke left out: 
suggestibility. In his early work with hypnosis, Freud discovered a radically generalized 
affectability (or sensitivity) that precedes the human use of symbols, logic, and even 
language. Davis unpacks the implication of reconciling Freud's insight with Burke's 
theory of identification: "What suggestibility suggests is a human capacity to be 'directly 
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and immediately' induced to action or attitude by another, sans all logical foundation and 
cognitive discretion; it involves a nonrepresentable and each time originary identification 
that takes place behind the back and beyond the reach of critical faculties" (32). This 
suggestibility, or the vulnerability to an immediate affection, closes the space between for 
identification that Burke will argue takes place through symbolic meaning. 
 Burke, Davis speculates, perhaps advanced his theory of identification as 
compensatory to division in an effort to install some distance, some space of ethicity 
between self and other, making a place for rational critique to call a halt to "horde 
instinct" that Freud posited as holding sociability together. But, Davis contends, the 
possibility of disconnection or disidentification is not "the effect of a critical 
intervention"—rather, "it emerges instead from a failure of identification, and 
interruption in narcissistic appropriation" (34). In other words, the consuming operation 
of identification is thwarted, the "devouring affection is interrupted... by a surplus of 
alterity that remains indigestible, inassimilable, unabsorbable." Davis emphasizes that 
"this failure cannot be produced through reason or critique" (35)—since an irrepressible 
affectability obtains, ensuring that reason alone cannot pierce it. The distance between 
self and other required to institute a space of ethicity only opens, Davis argues, "in the 
failure of identification, each time," since in that failure "'I' am opened to the other as 
other and get the chance to experience something like responsibility for the other that 
exceeds (and conflicts with) 'my' narcissistic passions" (35). That is, when you fail to 
fully identify with an other, your failure opens a chasm across which some relation to 
difference other than its total assimilation—through identification or through 
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suggestion—becomes possible. Instead of the mastery of this alterity through 
understanding it in terms of what you already are, your nonunderstanding, or 
disidentification, makes another ethical relation possible.51 
 This relation, I contend, can be called solidarity. The common sense of solidarity 
is that 'we are all in this together'—and what is it that we are all together in? Some shared 
world; some kind of struggle; something unites us, joins us to each other through what we 
share; something essential, crucial to the sharing of identity that is so important to 
rhetorical action. That is the common sense of solidarity. But an inessential solidarity is 
different: it is a solidarity based on nothing, based on nothing in common, nothing the 
same, and nothing shared. It is a solidarity based on no essence, in fact, based precisely 
on the fact that there is no essence to guarantee the individualism of the human being. 
Human being rather is given already in response to the alterity of the other (and this 
alterity is precisely what resists our identification and hampers our striving toward 
rhetorical action—it undoes figuration, refuses our identification, rejects our 
commonality, and in this distance/chasm/gap, it issues an ethical command: Thou shalt 
not kill. You should not and will not eradicate the difference between us. This 
complicated order of priority is what Levinas calls the "anachrony" of responsibility 
(Davis 14); that it comes first, before the subject "I" am/is there to properly hear and 
respond. Levinas argues, being is therefore already being-for: it must come first or else it 
would never come at all. Rhetorical address is already a response, always an address to 
                                                
51 "Disidentification" is used here to describe more than a simple miss or complete failure of identification: 
disidentification bears a transformative or revisionist relationship to identification, altering the dominant 
cultural scripts/fantasies through their reinscription (see Muñoz's Disidentifications: Queers of Color and 
the Performance of Politics). 
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an other, always across a chasm of difference, or else there would never be a reason to 
write or speak or make recourse to symbols. The appearance of the subject, the "I" who 
takes responsibility, responds to the command not to kill, does so (appears, responds) 
already in "a demonstration of solidarity that precedes understanding" (Davis 60). 
Inessential solidarity is the opening of a rhetorical relationality, through which the 
perception of difference or alterity comes after the response to it. The perception of 
difference is also a non-experience of it, a failure to grasp it, a sense that alterity has 
eluded your understanding. You only realize after you have missed it that there was 
something to be missed. This perception is a result of your response, a response which is 
not captured/contained/exhausted by/dependent on your understanding. 
 
BEING ADDRESSED: SOLIDARITY WITH ALTERITY 
 I want to show how this relation becomes legible in Twine games. You, for 
example, are often addressed in the second person. But instead of being asked to identify 
yourself with a heroic protagonist capable of superhuman strength and speed, your 
difference from the main characters of many Twine games is what actually matters. 
Instead of identifying with the "you" of the game and suppressing the differences, you are 
invited and encouraged to take notice of these differences, to experience them as 
instituting a space of ethical distance. You may not have reckoned with the trauma, 
violence, gender regimes or regimens, and more that Twine games can take you inside of. 
But what you can discover is that even from the inside, the seams still show. For 
example, in Porpentine's With Those We Love Alive, you are a smith or "artificer" who 
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makes weapons, crowns, and prostheses for a monstrous queen. You can leave the castle 
and visit the city, where there is a temple and a barlike dream distillery. 
 
Fig. 9. The places you can explore in With Those We Love Alive. 
 
You can walk through the royal gardens, or go down to the lake and meditate. When you 
go to your workshop, you can only work if you are rested, and you sometimes have to go 
back to your room to sleep. I bounced erratically, a bit bitterly, between drinking in the 
distillery, cursing the silence of the gods in the temple, and glowering when I'm unable to 
go to work. There are many rituals in the game, both optional and required—but every so 
often, before you can sleep, you have to have taken your hormones.  
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Fig. 10. Take hormones before you can sleep in With Those We Love Alive. 
 
Refusing to do so will keep you up—no matter for how long you rage between other 
places—and when you exhaust the temple, bar, and workshop, you finally have to attend 
to your body. You administer a gendering regimen that's almost incidental to the game's 
plot, but it is integral to your health and wellbeing and your advancement through the 
game. The hormones don't alter your character in any apparent way, but they keep you 
self-similar; they are identity maintenance, even self-care. And if the you who exists 
outside of the game doesn't have this type of gender regimen in your own life, you may 
notice the ritual as a stark difference. (And if you do, then you probably already have a 
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visceral knowledge of the opening hormones can make for navigating the rigid gender 
binarism that dominates your lived experience.)  
 Playing With Those We Love Alive can give you an opportunity to 'identify' with 
your character in which the difference between you remains indigestible, inassimilable, 
unabsorbable. Rather than identification, we may call this solidarity: your share in the 
experience of your character is always limited by your difference from her. With Those 
We Love Alive asks you to attend not only to the body of your character within the game, 
but also the own body that you are using to play the game. At various times throughout 
the game, you are asked to draw a sigil on your arm representative of some decision point 
or moment in the game. The stack of sigils you wind up with echoes the inscribed arms of 
others that are housed in the game's temple. Through the physical act of inscription, you 
are invited on the one hand to identify with your character—to imagine that your sigils 
are her sigils, too—but on the other hand, your attention is drawn to how you are not the 
player character: how your inscriptions stay outside of the game, on your own flesh, and 
how it maybe hurts if you chose too sharp a pen to draw with, or how long your drawings 
will last (probably days after you're done playing the game) if you chose a softer nibbed 
marker. When you complete the game, a link can take you to Porpentine's tumblr tag for 
the game, where she posts photos players have submitted of their sigils.52 
                                                
52 The photos are overwhelmingly (though not exclusively) white. Porpentine's Twine tutorial/manifesto 
"Creation Under Capitalism and the Twine Revolution" offers a stringent critique of whiteness and/as the 
repression of ordinary creativity. Merritt Kopas acknowledges in the introduction to Videogames for 
Humans that the Twine games that garner the most press are "still overwhelmingly white." For another look 
at Twine's diversity narrative, see Soha Kareem's "Tying in Diversity with Twine Games." 
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Fig. 11. Photos of sigils drawn on the arms of With Those We Love Alive players, 
published on Tumblr. 
 
 Another game, also by Porpentine, offers an even more explicit example of this 
solidarity, a sharing in experience that nevertheless underscores difference and distance. 
Howling Dogs garnered several awards, but it received a lot of attention in 2013 when 
Richard Hofmeier, winner of the 2013 Independent Games Festival's grand prize, spray 
painted "howling dogs" over his own festival booth. In Howling Dogs, you are trapped in 
a closed system of rooms. A room with your bunk in it is connected to a lavatory, 
metered food and water dispensers, a trash chute, a photograph of someone you seem to 
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have known, a room full of soothing screens identified as "the sanity room," and an 
"activity room" housing a virtual reality machine.  
 
 
Fig. 12. Your captive habitat in Howling Dogs. 
 
Once you've fed and watered yourself, you can engage the virtual reality machine and 
negotiate a series of varied scenarios: you are a scribe for the empire, a trapped and 
murderous woman, a Joan of Arc. The virtual reality machine—and the fact that most of 
the game's "action" only takes place when you're inside of it—installs even another layer 
of distance, to draw your attention to the artifice of the game and the constructedness of 
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your experience of reality. Not only are you being asked to identify with the player 
character that you are addressed as by Howling Dogs, but your player character within 
Howling Dogs is also asked to identify with the characters in the virtual reality machine. 
The ethical distance between you multiplies; imagining yourself to be the protagonist is 
not enough to fully close it. 
 Porpentine's Ultra Business Tycoon III opens with a simple and familiar interface 
that mimics a traditional computer game: you may start a new game, load a game, view 
options, read the guide, view the credits, or quit. You can get an early hint that Ultra 
Business Tycoon III is not what it purports to be if you try to load a game: clicking the 
link for the only saved file results in an italicized message: "Your big sister's save file. 
Best not to fuck with it." As you wend your way through the parodically violent business 
world, amassing tens of thousands of dollars and eluding cops, more italicized reflections 
create incursions into your opportunity to identify with the ultra business tycoon, and the 
"you" of ultra business tycoon separates from the "you" of Porpentine's game, and you 
learn that the power fantasy makes a kind of dissociative escape for the player, a young 
girl growing up in a violent home.  
 In a 2014 conference presentation, rhetorician Jim Brown offered a reading of 
Ultra Business Tycoon III as what he calls "obfuscated mapping," a kind of turn on the 
cognitive mapping done by graphical user interfaces. Brown writes, "The vast majority of 
games teach us that what we do makes sense, that we can control an environment, and 
that there is a clear relationship between actions and results." Ultra Business Tycoon III is 
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not like this. This game is home to a "realistic Bee AI," Subterranean Trash Zones, 
animals that ooze, and vomit you can't monetize.  
 
Fig. 13. Your thoughts on playing Ultra Business Tycoon III inside Ultra Business 
Tycoon III. 
 
Brown argues that obfuscation in the game's interface—impotence over a degrading trash 
landscape cordoned off from cleanliness, order, and safety; non sequitur consequences of 
illogical actions, death as random as rewards—obfuscation can "productively 
defamiliarize" your interaction with the game, and with its subjects (trauma, trash and 
capitalism), and you can learn to look at the screens that organize meaning that you're 
usually taught to look through. Of course, Twine is one of those screens. Drawing on 
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Friedhoff's platform study of Twine, Brown argues that "the taboo material" of many 
games made in Twine is linked to its status as an outsider platform through its low 
threshold for learning how to make games with it. And, I'd add, an emphasis on what 
Brown calls "forcing choice"—this hyperlink or that, or else the game won't advance—
makes Twine's procedures as crucial to this obfuscated mapping as the procedures of the 
games it has been used to produce. Brown closes his argument by positioning obfuscated 
mapping as not a simply neutral rhetorical practice of sense-making (or unmaking) but as 
inflected by the "array of practices and strategies deployed by LGBTQ writers" who 
"have used Twine to describe lives in which concepts like agency and control are 
especially fraught." 
 A Synchronous Ritual by Merritt Kopas is a game I can't win. When I start the 
game, it asks me if it's 6 p.m.; I answer no, and I'm instructed to wait. On the next day, I 
missed 6 p.m., and I think, maybe I should set an alarm on my phone. But for the second 
day in a row, I missed 6 p.m.—I was in the car when the phone alarm went off. On the 
third day, I finally made my appointment: at 6 p.m., I advanced the game and followed 
the instructions to not cheat, "and carry out all actions asked of you as far as possible." 
Per the game's instructions, I sat down with a full glass of water and two prescription 
bottles, although mine were empty. I let the game's sensuous descriptions of spiro and 
estradiol pills, which trans women may take for hormone replacement therapy, populate 
my imagination.  
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Fig. 14. Staring down a pill bottle in A Synchronous Ritual. 
 
But when the game told me to wait for the chemicals to affect me, to scan my reflection 
in the mirror for signs of feminization—that was not possible for me. I hit a rigid limit in 
my own gender against which I couldn't push further, couldn't identify, and so for me, I 
also hit a rigid limit in the reach of identification. And yet, in this failure of identification, 
I am opened to the other as other. I experience what Davis calls "something like 
responsibility" that exceeds and conflicts with my narcissistic passions, the limits of my 
own self-identity. I experience not identification—in this case, a vehement 
disidentification—but I am also open to solidarity with trans women who, because they 
have found or made routes of access to hormone replacement therapy (HRT), because 
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their daily lives can accommodate or be made to accommodate the routines HRT 
requires, are participating in a synchronous ritual—to maintain self-similarity through 
transformation. 
 Another game by Merritt Kopas makes a slightly different intervention through its 
address of the player as character. Conversations With My Mother also highlights the 
branching structure of Twine. The player is not addressed in the second person, but first 
chooses the name by which they will be addressed from three available options:  
"m------," "sweetheart," or "merritt."  
 
Fig. 15. You compose your own address in Conversations With My Mother. 
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Your choices compose an email or letter from Kopas's mother. At the end of any path 
through the game, hyperlinks take the player to tweets from Kopas's Twitter account that 
reflect on real exchanges with her mom like whichever one you've just had in the game. 
You might be tempted to say that Conversations With My Mother is autobiographical, but 
it's more complex than that. In the form of a game, you the player are addressed by 
Kopas's representation of her mom, so it is Kopas that you are invited to identify with. 
But the variables in the game that you select are part of the address coming from Kopas's 
mom—so your choices to some extent ventriloquize the person who addresses you. (It's 
worth noting, the Twitter account is a somewhat unstable object: the background and 
profile pictures change, for example, and you can see how people have replied to these 
tweets, or even how they continue to reply, after discovering them through the game.) 
Both Conversation with My Mother and A Synchronous Ritual address themselves to 
trans women: one of their most immediate and persuasive rhetorical effects is 
identification with predicaments of medicine and family e.g. that are specific and 
common to trans women's lives. But the games are also addressed to others, over and 
beyond the intention of the authors, to people who do not understand these experiences 
already because they are not part of your identity or experience already. This is part of 
what makes video games capacious and moving as a medium: even very specific stories 
for very specific audiences remain open for unanticipated audiences, too. The relation 
you are able to have to the characters you play is not simply identification, but solidarity: 
Twine games make use of the identificatory address of the second person as well as of its 
failure, sidelining identification and substituting in solidarity. 
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 A question that looms over all these games is how much identification actually is 
necessary for you to become "you," for anybody in particular to become the addressee of 
the game. You have to respond to the call. Take too much distance from the position of 
addressee and the tether that gives you occasion to dis/identify with the game might snap. 
Depression Quest offers a great example of this other kind of failure to identify: its Steam 
forum reviews are peppered with obnoxious complaints that you can't, for example, kill 
yourself in the game. Quinn has commented on the design decision not to make suicide 
an option: in part, she thought the possibility would be too triggering for players who 
already are struggling with depression. But she has also remarked on her responsibility as 
a developer to set a limit on the kind of violence players can do in the game. Depression 
Quest sits at an interesting juncture, having elicited the violent harassment of 
GamerGaters telling Quinn to kill herself, e.g., when the game itself was already a 
response to that violent exhortation. Many of the Twine games I've described are like 
this, too: already a response to the violence of mastering identification; already a way of 
issuing the command Levinas said comes from the face of the other: thou shall not kill. 
You are responsible for the other. That is solidarity. 
 And yet, nothing is assured. It's not as though a simple failure to identify can be 
counted as ethically pure. Solidarity is only an invitation, a condition of possibility for an 
ethical space to open. Porpentine's Twine tutorial/manifesto, "Creation Under Capitalism 
and the Twine Revolution," opens with this rhetorical invocation: "Our global network is 
composed of human minds uploaded into word form. On this plane the word is the most 
potent unit of force." She continues, presaging David OReilly's remarks to Vice: "It costs 
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a couple of keystrokes to control someone else's brain for a second, and longer if you do 
it right" (Webster). The affection of a word is forceful. Address exerts a control for which 
you are responsible. But this force of affection, this commanding of attention is the scene 
of relationality. Without it, there could be no solidarity. And, no identification: no gap to 
ever aim to close. Before the brass tacks of how to use Twine to make games, Porpentine 
makes an impassioned case for why, delving into the history of interactive fiction and the 
different affordances of parser and hypertext, and offering a stringent critique of the way 
whiteness and capitalism have colluded to kill off ordinary creativity. In a sea of stirring 
phrases that blur the line between manifesto and technical documentation, the phrase that 
speaks (calls) to me the most is this: "Write to be read." The relationality or rhetoricity of 
address rings out of this declaration: write for others.  
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Dehiscence: Inconclusion 
 
[H]ow can you hear anything, since you are nothing and you do not as such exist prior 
to the call? The call befalls you, and you cannot prevent the "falling" which you are: it 
throws you. You are thrown (geworfen)—thrown off before any "I" can constitute itself 
or any subject can be thrown together. 
— Avital Ronell, The Telephone Book 
 
For there to be any sharing of symbolic meaning, any construction of common enemy or 
collective goal, any effective use of persuasive discourse at all, a more originary 
rhetoricity must already be operating, a cons[t]itutive persuadability and responsivity that 
testifies, first of all, to a fundamental structure of exposure. 
— Diane Davis, Inessential Solidarity  
 
 In this inconclusion or afterword, this dissertation finally reaches its expiration. 
Expiration: defined in the Oxford English Dictionary first as "the action of breathing out" 
(), expiration implies that a breath has been drawn in, maybe held, and now releases, air 
exiting to the outside from an inside that it both traverses and joins. I have argued that 
this work is already responding to a call for scholarship that tracks what Diane Davis 
called "a radically generalized rhetoricity" (36). Rhetoricity is the irremissible 
exposedness that brings one into being as a subject in language, that is, as a rhetorical 
subject. Rhetoricity accords priority to rhetoric as a relation of addressivity: before 
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symbolic persuasion, before thinking and knowing, and even before the experience of 
being, a rhetorical affectability obtains, calling singularities into existence as subjects in 
language. In Inessential Solidarity, Davis argues that scholarly inquiry into rhetoricity 
demands a rethinking of both "affect" and of the language relation itself (166). 
 What I hope to have shown in this work is that rhetoricity is already freighted 
with a compelling affective force. It is a force we may describe as moving, cutting, even 
shattering, operating at a presubjective level. As Avital Ronell argues in a Heideggerian 
register in The Telephone Book: Technology, Schizophrenia, Electric Speech, a call 
comes in before you have put or pulled yourself together—before any individuated "you" 
is there to hear the call at all. "[Y]ou are nothing and you do not exist prior to the call," 
Ronell contends (66). And yet, something in you, or something that gives an inwardness 
to you, responds. Outside of the rhetorical domain of symbolic exchange, prior to the 
agentive power of the rhetorical subject, a rhetorical effectivity takes place: it moves, it 
cuts, it shatters. Your exposedness to being addressed means that you are always first of 
all open to receiving a call; The Rhetoric of Sensitivity has sought to explore rhetoricity as 
the condition of possibility for this reception. 
 The three chapters this dissertation comprises offer three different exposures of 
the exposedness that brings this rhetorical subject into being, but never fully or 
independently of the structure of addressivity which opens every one to others. One's 
own being is always outside oneself, beside oneself, and for the other. If addiction 
represents a certain attempt to close the subject off from the affection of exteriority, even 
addiction still also keeps its subject open, under an influence that joins one's interiority to 
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the outside it seems to threatens to block off. Trigger warnings are, rather than another 
such attempt to close students off, another possible way of opening, of negotiating the 
many forms of violence and trauma that affect each of us in language, even in the 
classroom, even among friends. Rather than subsuming the differences that shape and 
define the queer quiddities of others, an inessential solidarity, beneath and before the 
suasive sameness of identification, can be glimpsed in the "obfuscated mapping" of 
Twine games. The rhetorical activities of reading, feeling, and identifying are resignified 
as routes into and through the rhetorical subject and not only tasks undertaken by it. 
 The Rhetoric of Sensitivity is one inscription of the "fundamental structure of 
exposure" (Davis 3) that makes any address possible. I cannot say I have answered the 
call that brought this writing into being, only that I have responded. Already this work is 
ready to be rewritten, to expire, and then inspire a reinscription, a different exposure. 
Inspiration: the action of breathing in, "a drawing in of air" (OED). My hope is that this 
work will open for other rhetoricians the rhetoric of the saying that opened it for me. 
Underneath this writing, or any reading, or question, the rhetoricity of address forges the 
way. In "Violence and Metaphysics," Jacques Derrida writes: 
I could not possibly speak of the Other, make of the Other a theme, pronounce the 
Other as object, in the accusative. I can only, I must only speak to the other; that 
is, I must call him in the vocative, which is not a category, a case of speech, but, 
rather the bursting forth, the very raising up of speech. 
So this writing, which investigates the ways that language cracks us open, can never 
simply say how we are cracked, but always must travel the same pathway that it seeks to 
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describe. A dissertation is also an address, a writing to others, an enunciation which it 
cannot only (simply) describe. There will be no definitive text that captures rhetoricity by 
appropriating it to meaning, "no way to assume a masterful scholarly pose" (Davis 15) 
and leave the rhetoric of the saying in repose. Every rhetoric of the saying does instead 
the ceaseless work of "excavating, examining, and affirming the saying as rhetoric, as an 
extra-symbolic rhetorical appeal" (Davis 17). One more text will not be enough. 
 In my introduction, I described my method as dehiscence, a rupturing open that 
may describe either a blossom or a wound. There is perhaps an indeterminable relation 
between those two alternatives: what bears fruit may also injure; what pierces one's 
defenses may also germinate and thrive. I consign this exposition to a futurity where 
rhetorical receptivity will have been amplified, when we will have realized and already 
begun to reinvent the possibility for responding otherwise. 
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